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INTRODUCTION
VAT may be thought of as the Mata Hari of the tax world-many are
tempted, many succumb, some tremble on the brink, while others leave only to
return, eventually the attraction appears irresistible.
Alan A. Tait'
On April 1, 1989, Japan enacted the three percent Consumption
Tax (CT),2 becoming the forty-sixth nation to impose a variation of
the "indirect" tax known as a value-added tax (VAT).3 Authorities
* The author is currently a May, 1991 J.D. candidate at The Washington College of
Law, The American University.
1. A. TAIT, VALUE ADDED TAX: INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AND PROBLEMS 3 (1988); see
also Gordon, The Business Transfer Tax-A VAT By Any Other Name, 30 TAX NoTEs 765, 765
(1986) (describing value-added tax as both "dangerous and tantalizing" solution to United
States budget deficit).
2. Kyodo News Service, Apr. 1, 1989 (Japanese Morning Newspaper Headlines) (Lexis,
Nexis library, Int'l file). The original consumption tax bill delayed implementation of the tax
to September 1, 1989, six months after implementation of other tax reforms so as to enhance
the initial economic effect of the reforms. Guttman, Japanese Tax Reform-The Impossible
Dream?, 41 TAX NoTEs 1016, 1019 (1988). For a discussion of other Japanese tax reforms in
1988, see infra note 20 and accompanying text. For the specifics of the tax, see National Tax
Administration, Ministry of Finance,Japan, Outline of Consumption Tax (Provisional English
translation of Law No. 108, part IV of 1988 as part of its Outline of Tax Reform (Zeisei
Kaikaku Yoku) available at the Ministry of Finance, Tokyo, Japan) [hereinafter Japanese CT].
The National Tax Administration (NTA), Japan's equivalent of the Internal Revenue Service,
administers the tax laws. O'Keefe, Japanese Tax Law: A Canadian Perspective, 20 U. BRrr.
COLUM. L. REv. 401, 441 (1986). The NTA oversees the administration of the CT. National
Tax Administration, Ministry of Finance, Main Points of Tax Reform § 4(l)(10) (English sum-
mary of Law No. 108 of 1988 (Shohizei-ho)) (available at the Embassy of Japan, Section on
Taxation and Finance, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter Main Points of Tax Reform]. The Tax
Bureau conducts research and plans and drafts tax laws. O'Keefe, supra, at 440. Both the
NTA and the Tax Bureau are subdivisions of the Ministry of Finance. Id.
3. A. TAIT, supra note 1, at 39-41. Other countries levying some form of VAT are Ar-
gentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Korea,
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impose a VAT along the chain of production and distribution on the
value added by each producer or distributor to a good or service.4
VAT calculations are similar to those required to calculate American
state sales taxes. 5 The VAT differs from the sales tax, however, in
Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Peru, Phil-
ippines, Senegal, Sweden, Taiwan, Turkey, and Uruguay. Id. In addition, the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) requires its members (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom)
to adopt a VAT as a condition of membership. Turnier, Designing an Eflcient Value Added Tax,
39 TAX L. REV. 435, 436 n.2 (1984) (describing VATs in EEC). Several other nations may
enact proposed VATs as well, including Canada, Iceland, and Poland. A. TAIT, supra note 1, at
40-41.
4. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH-VALUE-ADDED TAX 5 (1984) (Treasury Department Report to the
President), reprinted in Treasury Report on Tax Simplification and Reform-Value-Added Tax,
71 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 56, at 5 (Dec. 27, 1984) [hereinafter DEPARTMENT OF
TREASURY] (explaining that VAT is collected "at each stage or point" in chain of production
and distribution). There are actually three different "styles" of VAT: consumption, gross-
national-product and national-income. Schenk, Policy Issues in the Design of a Value-Added Tax:
Some Recent Developments in OECD Countries, 32-72 TAX NOTES INT'L 111, 124 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Schenk, Policy Issues] (defining VAT styles). The Japanese CT, like most VATs, is a con-
sumption-style VAT, taxing the value of goods and services "sold or transferred for personal
consumption." Id. All references to VAT herein are to the consumption-style VAT unless
otherwise indicated.
There are three alternative methods used to determine a taxpayer's VAT liability. Two of
these are "direct" VATs and the third is an "indirect" VAT. A. TArr, supra note 1, at 4-5. The
first "direct" VAT is the addition method, which imposes VAT directly on the sum of the four
general economic factors of production (profits, wages, rent, and interest). Schenk, Value Ad-
ded Tax: Does This Consumption Tax Have a Place in the Federal Tax System?, 7 VA. TAX REV. 207,
226 (1987) [hereinafter Schenk, Value Added Tax] (discussing economic factors of production).
The VAT adopted, though never enacted, by Japan in 1950 allowed for an optional calculation
using the addition method. Bronfenbrenner, The Japanese Value-Added Sales hx, 3 NAT'L TAXJ.
298, 312-13 (1950) (discussing 1953 amendment that allowed addition method). In fact, the
Japanese accounting industry of the time argued for an addition method VAT because, indus-
try members claimed, it was a more practical measure ofJapanesefua-kachi (added-value)
than the sales-subtractive method. Id. at 306 (relating opposition to 1950 VAT); see G. GREG-
ORY, THE LOGIC OFJAPANESE ENTERPRISE 27 (Sophia University Institute of Comparative Cul-
ture Business Series No. 92, 1982) (noting that added-value is useful concept in Japan where
highest priority is "efficient management of scarce resources").
The second "direct" VAT is the sales-subtractive method or business transfer tax. A.
SCHENK, VALUE ADDED TAx-A MODEL STATUTE AND COMMENTARY: A REPORT OF THE COM-
MITTEE ON VALUE ADDED TAX OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF TAXATION 3
(American Bar Association Section of Taxation, 1989) (proposing model tax statute and pro-
viding commentary) [hereinafter Value Added Tax Act refers to the proposed legislation and
A. SCHENK, COMMENTARY refers to the commentary].
The "indirect" VAT is the subtractive-indirect or credit-subtractive method. This VAT dif-
fers from the addition and sales-subtractive methods because it is a transactional tax, applying
the tax rate to each individual component of value-added (qualifying sales multiplied by the
applicable tax rate less VAT paid to suppliers on qualifying purchases) as opposed to a period
tax, which applies the tax rate to a net figure representing value-added at a certain point in
time. A. SCHENK, COMMENTARY, supra, at 4. The Japanese CT is a variation of the credit-
subtractive VAT. See infra text accompanying notes 98-113 (discussing computation of CT
liability). The EEC nations impose a credit-subtractive VAT as well. See Chiu & Siegel, What
the Value-Added Tax Is AllAbout, 67 TAXES: THE TAX MAGAZINE 3, 4-5 (1989) (describing credit-
subtractive VAT used in EEC).
5. See McLure, The Value-Added Tax: Effects on Productivity and Equity, 20 TAX NOTES 971,
972 (1983) (describing VAT as alternative sales tax calculation); see also DEPARTMENT OF
TREASURY, supra note 4, at 5 (defining VAT as "multistage sales tax"). If the United States
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that the taxpayer reduces the sales tax base6 by the VAT paid to
previous producers or distributors7 in the chain.8
VATs are broad-based taxes that generally provide few exemp-
tions from tax liability.9 In this respect, the VAT, as a consumption
tax,'0 differs drastically from an income tax that generally provides
many "exemptions" from tax vis-a-vis deductions and credits from
gross income."l
The CT sparked a fierce political struggle between Japan's ruling
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 12 the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP),
adopted a federal VAT, its similarity to state sales taxes could cause friction between the fed-
eral and state governments because the federal government has traditionally reserved the
sales tax base for the states. Aaron, The Political Economy of a Value-Added Tax in the United States,
38 TAx NoTEs 111, 1115 (1988) (making federalism argument in relation to United States
VAT). But see Brannon, The Value Added Tax is a Good Utility Infielder, 37 NAT'L TAxJ. 303, 309
(1984) (arguing that federal and state governments presently impose income, tobacco, and
alcohol taxes on similar tax bases); Schenk, Value Added Tax, supra note 4, at 294 (explaining
that adoption of significant federal excise taxes during World War II did not hamper states'
ability to collect sales taxes). In fact, availability of the deduction under section 164 of the
Internal Revenue Code for state and local taxes paid during the tax year may actually enhance
taxpayer compliance with state income taxes. Id.; see I.R.C. § 164 (1986) (setting forth deduc-
tion for state and local taxes).
6. One calculates the sales tax base, known as the output tax liability in accepted VAT
terminology, by multiplying taxable sales by the applicable tax rate. Schenk,Japanese Consump-
tion Tax: The Japanese Brand VAT, 42 TAX NoTEs 1625, 1626 (1989).
7. See id. (identifying this component of VAT equation as input tax credit); see also supra
note 4 and accompanying text (describing different VAT methods).
8. The normal retail sales tax, like that levied by many states, is designed to function as
a tax on consumer spending. J. DUE &J. MIKESELL, SALES TAXATION: STATE & LOCAL STRuc-
TURE & ADMINISTRATION 50 (1983) (analyzing structure of retail sales tax). That is, although
the seller is ultimately liable for payment of the tax, it passes that liability on to the purchaser,
i.e., the consumer, by raising the price of the product sold. Id. It is idealistic to assume,
however, that all businesses will sell their goods to the next link on the chain of production
and distribution free of retail sales tax. See McLure, State and Local Implications of a Pederal
Value-Added Tax, 38 TAX NOTES 1517, 1520 (1988) (noting some non-retail businesses actually
incur sales tax in United States). When a business incurs sales tax on its transfer of a product
to another business, and a retailer also incurs sales tax upon final sale of the product to the
consumer, an element of double taxation, or cascading, is introduced. Id. at 1520, 1527. The
VAT avoids the cascading that may result from a retail sales tax by allowing the input tax
credit against gross tax liability. Schenk, supra note 6, at 1626.
9. See Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 113-16 (discussing desirability of broad tax
base).
10. According to Thomas Hobbes, consumption is a better measure of tax liability than
income because one should pay for withdrawing from society's limited resources and not be
liable to pay for what one contributes to those resources (that contribution presumably being
measured by one's income). Schenk, Value Added Tax, supra note 4, at 223 (noting T. HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 184 (Dutton ed. 1914)).
11. The assertion that a VAT tax base is broader than an income tax base is not immedi-
ately clear. See Schuyler, Consumption Taxes: Promises & Problems, 25 TAX NOTES 571, 571 (1984)
(arguing income will likely exceed consumer expenditures in given year). The United States
income tax system, however, uses an elaborate scheme of deductions and credits that reduce
gross income. S. SURREY, P. MCDANIEL, H. AULT & S. KOPPELMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION: CASES AND MATERIALS 73 (successor ed. 1986) [hereinafter S. SURREY]; see I.R.C. § 63
(1986) (defining taxable income as gross income reducbd by deductions and credits). The tax
rate is imposed on the resulting taxable income. Id.
12. The LDP has been the ruling political party inJapan for 35 years. Hiatt,Japanese Keep
LDPin Power, Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 1990, at Al, col. 6. The LDP is the largest, most conserva-
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and three smaller Japanese political parties.' 3 The LDP had held a
majority in both houses of the Japanese Diet14 since 1955. How-
ever, theJSP defeated the LDP in theJuly 1989 general elections for
the House of Councilors. 15 Most voters, particularly consumers,
disapproved of the CT because of anticipated price increases follow-
ing its introduction.'6
tive political party in Japan. Y. NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAw 89 (A. Angelo trans./
ed. 1976). Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, an LDP member, was Japan's third Prime Minister in
1989. Shapiro & Hiatt, Kaifu Seeks Closer U.S. Ties, Wash. Post, Aug. 30, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita ruled from November 1987 to May 1989 and was in office
when the Diet enacted the CT law in December 1988. Schenk, supra note 6, at 1626. Prime
Minister Sasuke Uno governed from May to August 1989. Party Leaders, Except Uno, Launch
Election Drive, Kyodo News Service, July 5, 1989 (Lexis, Nexis library, Int'l file) [hereinafter
Party Leaders].
13. See Japanese Ruling Party's Membership Decreases Sharply, Xinhau General Overseas News
Service, Sept. 16, 1989 (Lexis, Nexis library, Int'l file) (attributing 40% decline in LDP mem-
bership to CT, Recruit Company stock-for-favors scandal, former Prime Minister Uno's al-
leged affair, and liberalization of tariffs imposed on imported farm products). The JSP is the
second largest political party in Japan and is the largest opposition group to both the LDP and
the CT. Id. The three small opposition parties are the Komeito, the Japanese Communist
Party (JCP) and the United Social Democratic Party (USDP). Party Leaders, supra note 12.
Komeito, formed in 1962 and affiliated with the Buddhist sect, is the number two opposition
party. Y. NODA, supra note 12, at 89. Koshiro Ishida, the present leader of Komeito, had
accused the LDP of breaking its 1986 election promise not to impose a large-scale indirect
tax. Party Leaders, supra note 12. More recently, however, Komeito members have indicated
that they may align themselves with the LDP in upcoming elections. See Lehner, Japan 's
"Clean " Party Attracts Attention as It Ponders a Link with Ruling LDP, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1989, at
A16, col. 2 [hereinafter LehnerJapan 's "Clean" Party] (discussing desirability of LDP-Komeito
link). TheJCP and the USDP are more likely to join with theJSP in opposing the LDP and the
CT. See Party Leaders, supra note 12 (noting harsh opposition to CT by members ofJCP and
USDP).
14. The Diet is the "highest organ of state power" in Japan. KENPO (Constitution) art.
41 (Japan) (English translation prepared by Public Information Bureau, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Japan, reprinted in ROMAN, Japan, in 8 CONsTrrUToNs OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1990)) [hereinafter KENPO]. It consists of the House of
Representatives and the House of Councilors. KENPO art. 42; see supra note 12 (noting dura-
tion of LDP control in Japan).
15. Shapiro & Hiatt, supra note 12, at A32, col. 2. The LDP controls the majority in the
House of Representatives, the chamber of the Diet that is constitutionally empowered to se-
lect the Prime Minister when the two Houses cannot agree. Id. at A32, col. 4; see KENPO art.
67. Japanese law required a general election for the House of Representatives by mid-1990.
Lehner, In Japan, Battle for One Parliament Seat Is Likely to Set Political Tone for Months, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 28, 1989, at A10, col. 1 [hereinafter Lehner, In Japan].
16. Shapiro & Hiatt, supra note 12, at A32, col. 4. Japanese women predominantly com-
prise the consumer movement. See Lo, Japan's Women Make Inroads Into the World of Business,
Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 1989, at C15, col. 1 (Special Advertising Section: Japanese Business
Survey) (noting traditional view of Japanese wife as more powerful family leader regarding
domestic matters). Statistics support the assertion that women are upset with the LDP: 60%
of all women voted in the July upper house elections, in which the LDP lost its upper house
majority, as compared to 40% in other recent elections. Ohmae,Japanese Fed Up With Adoles-
cent Politics, Wall St.J., Oct. 25, 1989, at A19, col. 3. Other groups opposing the CT include
small businesses, farmers, doctors, self-employed individuals, and trade unions. Generally,
their opposition stems from the high costs of complying with the new tax, its generally regres-
sive nature, and the price increases that usually accompany the introduction of a VAT. See
Guttman, supra note 2, at 1017; M. Homma, T. Maeda & K. Hasimoto,Japan in COMPARATIVE
TAx SYSTEMS: EUROPE, CANADA, AND JAPAN 433 (J. Pechman ed. 1987) [hereinafter J.
Pechman] (describing CT opposition). But see Department Stores Oppose Early Revision of Consump-
1991] THE JAPANESE CONSUMPTION TAX 1269
Diet members failed to reach a compromise regarding the CT
during a 1989 "extraordinary session."1 7 Accordingly, Japan held a
general election on February 18, 1990, in which the LDP retained its
majority in the lower house. 18 It is unclear, however, whether the
LDP victory represents public approval of the CT or frustration over
dissatisfying alternatives.' 9
The Japanese CT is only one provision of the 1988 Japanese tax
reform.20 When one views the 1988 tax reform in its totality, it is
surprising that the CT has been so controversial, because it is only
one factor in an overall reduction of tax revenues.2 ' Although the
Japanese government expects gross CT revenues for fiscal 1990 of
approximately six trillion yen ($46 billion),22 the entire tax reform
tion Tax, Kyodo News Service, Sept. 13, 1989 (Lexis, Nexis library, Int'l file) (reportingJapan
Department Stores Association opposes abolition or revision of CT before all industries are
able to fully implement tax); Business Group Warns Against Tax Modiication, Jiji Press Ticker
Service, Aug. 7, 1989 (Lexis, Nexis library, Int'l file) (reporting that members ofJapan Associ-
ation of Corporate Executives believe CT is vital to Japan's economy and to nation's rapidly
aging society).
17. See Japanese Sales Tax, Wall St.J., Oct. 3, 1989, at A18, col. 1 (reporting Prime Minis-
ter Kaifu's announcement that LDP would review, not abolish, tax). An "extraordinary" ses-
sion of the Diet convened on September 27, 1989 to discuss the future viability of the CT.
Lehner, In Japan, supra note 15, at AI0, col. 1. TheJapanese Constitution [hereinafter Kenpo]
authorizes "extraordinary" sessions of the Diet. See KENPo art. 53 (allowing for extraordinary
sessions when demanded by one-quarter of total members of either House and approved by
Cabinet). Recent actions by the JSP-controlled upper house of the Diet illustrate the futility
of joint house action. The upper house voted to repeal the CT even though the LDP-con-
trolled lower house would not approve this action. See Opposition Victoy, Wall St. J., Dec. 12,
1989, at A16, col. I (noting move to repeal CT by upper house represents symbolic victory at
best); see also Woo, Gov't Worried About Political Impact on Future Policy, Kyodo News Service, July
27, 1989 (Lexis, Nexis library, Int'l file) (noting failure ofJSP to recommend feasible alterna-
tive to CT).
18. Prime Minister Kaifu dissolved the House onJanuary 24, 1990, thus accelerating the
general election. See Kenpo art. 54 (explaining that Japan must hold general election within
40 days of dissolution of House of Representatives); see also LehnerJapan Parliamentary Cam-
paign Begins, With Abe Jockeying for Premier's Spot, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1990, at A10, col. 3 (dis-
cussing dissolution of lower house and upcoming election).
19. See Graven,Japan Faces Turning Point in Sunday Vote, Wall St.J., Feb. 16, 1990, at A10,
col. 4 (noting image ofJSP as "oppos[ing] everything and stand[ing] for nothing"). Debate
over the CT continues in Japan. Rodger, Diet Clash Likely Over Budget, Fin. Times, June 9,
1990, at 3, col. 1. The LDP has proposed exempting food and other necessity items; the
opposition parties insist on abolishing the tax. Id.
20. See generally Main Points of Tax Reform, supra note 2 (outlining 1988 tax reforms).
Other tax reform measures include a reduction in both the tax rates and number of brackets
for the individual and corporate income taxes and the individual inhabitants tax, and increase
in the standard exemptions from the individual income tax. Main Points of Tax Reform
§§ 1(1), 1(2), 1(3), 5(l). The most important new source of tax revenue, other than the CT, is
the 20% tax on capital gains from securities. Id. § 2(1). Taxpayers subject to the capital gains
tax may either file a tax return upon final disposition of the security and thus be liable for tax
on the actual gain, or withhold an estimated tax liability on a "deemed" five percent gain on
sales of publicly-held stocks or other securities. Id. This Comment will concentrate on the
CT and discuss these other reforms only to the extent that they are relevant to the CT.
21. See Guttman, supra note 2, at 1019 (explaining this phenomenon in detail).
22. Japan Begins Discussing Revision of 3 Percent Consumption Tax, Daily Rep. for Executives,
Sept. 19, 1989, at G-1 (Lexis, Nexis library, Omni file) [hereinafterJapan Begins Discussing Revi-
sion]. This Comment employs an assumed exchange rate of 130 yen per one dollar. *The
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package will actually reduce tax revenues by almost 3.1 trillion yen
($23 billion).23
The CT law contains several unique and innovative VAT features,
including easier record-keeping requirements for taxpayers, 24 the
use of very few tax exemptions coupled with a low three percent tax
rate, 25 and preferential treatment for small and medium-sized busi-
nesses. 26 These value-added-tax features warrant serious considera-
tion by tax analysts in the United States. Tax scholars have debated
the merits of a United States VAT for several years,27 but have been
unable to ascertain whether a new tax, such as a VAT, would be su-
perior to the current income tax system.28
This Comment assumes that the goal of any system of taxation is
to balance the competing objectives of efficiency and equity29 and
proposes that the Japanese CT presents a novel approach in resolv-
ing this tradeoff by imposing a low tax rate on an extremely broad
tax base.30 In addition, the Comment concludes that the simplified
record-keeping requirements of the CT law encourage compliance
actual exchange rate as of November 2, 1990, was 130.60 yen per one dollar. Wall St.J., Nov.
2, 1990, at C1, col. 1. The fiscal year in Japan begins on April 1. MarkJapan's GNP Contracted
in Latest PeriodAs Personal Consumption, Exports Fell, Wall St.J., Sept. 22, 1989, at Al0, col. 4.
23. Guttman, supra note 2, at 1019.
24. See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text (explaining account-based method).
25. See infra notes 119-30 and accompanying text (listing activities and transactions enti-
tled to tax exemption under CT law).
26. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text (discussing administrative merits of
preferential treatment for small and medium-sized businesses).
27. See, e.g. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, supra note 4, at 27 (attributing first VAT proposals
to 1919); Schenk, The Business Transfer Tax: The Value Added by Subtraction, 30 TAx NOTES 351,
351 n.5, n.6 (1986) (noting 1943 VAT proposal and discussing President Nixon's varied opin-
ions on value-added taxation); Galvin, It's VAT TimeAgain, 21 TAx NOTES 275, 277-78 (1983)
(considering VAT scheme envisioned in 1980 Tax Restructuring Act, H.R. 5665, 96th Cong.,
Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 9492 (1980)). There were two proposed VAT statutes in 1989. See
Value Added Tax Act, supra note 4; Deficit and Debt Reduction Act of 1989 (proposed in S.
442, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S1665-69 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989) (Sen. Hol-
lings)) [hereinafter Deficit and Debt Reduction Act of 1989]. There was also a 1990 VAT
proposal in Congress. See Tax Reform and Competitiveness Act (proposed in S. 2084, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S. 898-906 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1990) (Sen. Hollings)) [herein-
after TRAC Act]; see also infra notes 240-76 and accompanying text (comparing recent pro-
posed VAT legislation in United States to CT law).
28. This Comment will not specifically consider the tax ramifications of the CT on
United States citizens. Generally, however, a United States taxpayer may deduct VAT paid to
a foreign government (I.R.C. § 164 (1986)) or report a tax credit for the VAT paid vis a vis the
foreign tax credit (I.R.C. § 903 (1986)). The tax must be either an income or war tax, or a tax
in lieu of an income or war tax to be eligible for the foreign tax credit. J. BISCHEL & R.
FEINSCHREIBER, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 66, 68 (2d ed. 1985) (explaining
"in lieu of" test). VATs are generally ineligible for the foreign tax credit. Id. at 68.
29. See A. OKUN, EqUALrY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 88-91 (1975) (contend-
ing that compromise ought to be struck between efficiency and equity, but that such middle
ground may be unattainable). Compare M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 161-66 (1962)
(advocating efficiency over equity) withJ. RAWLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 60-62 (1971) (advocat-
ing equality over efficiency).
30. See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text (illustrating CT calculations).
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with its requirements.31
Part I considers the history of VAT in Japan. This section illus-
trates the extent to which Japan's prior experience with a VAT fol-
lowing World War II shaped its current disposition against value-
added taxation. This section also reveals some similarities and dif-
ferences between the American andJapanese tax structures. Part II
presents a brief overview of the CT law, including methods of calcu-
lating the tax, exemptions from the tax, and the determination of
who pays the tax. Part III analyzes the law, concentrating on the
unique characteristics of the CT and compares its provisions with
those of recently proposed VAT legislation in the United States.
This Comment concludes that the Japanese Diet should not re-
peal the CT; rather, it should grant an exemption or establish a
credit system for consumer food purchases to appease Japan's con-
sumer movement. This Comment also urges the United States to
adopt a broad-based VAT with a low rate, modeled after the Japa-
nese CT legislation. The United States can use VAT revenues either
to reduce the growing budget deficit 32 or to fund proposed social
programs. 33
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF JAPANESE TAX POLICY
The current predisposition against value-added taxation in Japan
may be an outgrowth of that nation's previous experiences with a
VAT during the Allied occupation following World War 11. 3 4 An
American-led post-war mission to Japan developed a Japanese VAT
to raise substantial local revenues. 35 The Diet repealed the tax prior
to its implementation for several reasons, one of which was public
disapproval.3 6 This experience resulted in a general aversion to in-
direct taxes such as the VAT. 37
Prior to the introduction of the CT law in 1988, Japan relied less
31. See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text (describing CT record-keeping
requirements).
32. See McLure, The Value-Added Tax: Key to Deficit Reduction, 35 TAX NoTEs 83, 83 (1987)
(suggesting that deficit reductions targeted by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act might be more
easily attained through imposition of VAT); see also S. 2084, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., 136 CONG.
REC. 5898 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1990) (Sen. Hollings) (explaining that proposed VAT should
result in deficit reduction).
33. See S. 442, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S1665 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989)
(Sen. Hollings) (explaining that VAT revenues can be used to finance social programs).
34. See infra notes 68-84 and accompanying text (discussing 1950 VAT proposal).
35. Guttman, supra note 2, at 1017.
36. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text (outlining reasons for negative public
reaction to VAT).
37. J. PECHMAN, supra note 16, at 418-19 (discussing system of indirect taxes used in
Japan prior to introduction of CT).
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on indirect consumption taxes than any country in the world. 38 Ja-
pan utilized an indirect tax, the commodity tax, until its repeal and
replacement with the CT in 1989. 39 The commodity tax was, how-
ever, an ineffective, inefficient, and confused system of multiple rate
taxes. 40 By the mid-1980s, Japan desperately needed to simplify its
indirect tax structure.4 '
Japanese lawmakers have tended to rely on existing European and
American legislation in promulgating their own laws. Japan based
its original tax structure on Western systems and deviated from this
structure only once, during World War II, when the government
needed to finance the war effort.42 After the war, the Allies rebuilt
Japan's tax system in their own image, successfully "American-iz-
ing" the Japanese tax structure.43 Today, the tax system reflects
both East and West; in particular, the CT is Japan's version of the
European VAT.
A. Japanese Tax Policy: Pre- World War II
The Japanese government announced plans to create the nation's
first organized tax system in 1868.44 Like many reforms of that pe-
riod, the plan borrowed heavily from Western tax ideology.45 Al-
38. Pechman, World Tax Reform: A Progress Report, 39 TAx NOTES 245, 246 (1988). In
1985, consumption taxes (including sales, value-added and excise taxes, border taxes, taxes
on transfers of property and securities, and other taxes) comprised only 4.85S of gross domes-
tic product (GDP) in Japan. Id. This is substantially less than the percent of tax revenue from
consumption taxes to GDP in other countries: Denmark (17.7%o), France (15.4%o), Sweden
(13.8%o), the United Kingdom (12.4%o), and the Netherlands (12.1%o). Id. In the United
States, however, consumption taxes, comprised mainly of national excise taxes, were 5.2%0 of
the GDP in 1985.
39. J. PECHMAN, supra note 16, at 418-19. The commodity tax was an indirect tax consist-
ing of two classes of taxable items. Id. at 418. Class one consisted of precious stones, metal
products, fur, carpet, and similar items. Id. The tax rate for most class one items was 15%'.
Id. Class two consisted of televisions, cameras, furniture, and similar items, taxed at several
different rates, ranging from five percent for coffee to 30% for yachts. Id. In 1989, the CT
replaced the national commodity tax, the local levies on electricity, gas and timber delivery,
and the following national taxes: playing-cards tax, sugar excise tax, admission tax, and travel
tax. Main Points of Tax Reform § 4(1)(8); see infra notes 281-84 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing intended uses of CT revenues).
40. SeeJ. PECHMAN, supra note 16, at 431 (identifying simplification of consumption taxa-
tion as goal ofJapanese tax reform).
41. Id. at 418-19 (describing complex indirect tax provisions that existed in 1986).
42. See Uematsu, Computation of Income in Japanese Income Taxation: A Study in the Adjustment
of Theory to Reality, in LAw IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 571 (A. von
Mehren ed. 1963) (notingJapanese tendency to copy laws of other societies).
43. See id. at 580 (discussing similarities between United States and Japanese tax struc-
tures subsequent to World War II).
44. O'Keefe, supra note 2, at 405. The Charter Oath of Five Articles, which pre-dated
the 1889 Meiji Constitution by 21 years, announced the Japanese tax system. Takayanagi, A
Century of Innovation: The Development ofJapanese Law, 1868-1961, in LAW INJAPAN: THIE LEGAL
ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 5 (A. von Mehren ed. 1963).
45. Uematsu, supra note 42, at 569. TheJapanese system of national taxation developed
during the Meiji regime, or restoration, a period of major Japanese reforms. The promulga-
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most twenty years later, in 1887, Japan adopted the national income
tax.46 It is not surprising that the first major Japanese tax was an
income tax, because many Western nations relied heavily on that tax
at the time.47
Although the Japanese government did not impose the national
income tax on corporations, the corporate entity became subject to
an income tax by the Income Tax Law of 1899.48 This law ex-
empted dividends from taxation, thereby preventing the "double
taxation" that often results from the simultaneous imposition of
both corporate and individual income taxes.49 Notions of equity
vanished from Japanese corporate tax policy by 1940, however,
when taxing authorities amended the corporate income tax to im-
pose a flat eighteen percent tax rate on corporate income.50 Taxing
authorities used this tax to finance the Japanese war effort in World
War II.51 After the war, Japan needed both an economic overhaul
and a tax restructuring to finance the country's post-war
reconstruction.5 2
B. Japanese Tax Policy: Post World War II (1945-1957)
Japan desperately needed an effective tax system after World War
II. The government owed 105.7 billion yen for debts incurred dur-
tion ofJapan's first written constitution in 1889 was one of the many accomplishments of this
era. See Takayanagi, supra note 44, at 5-6 (discussing promulgation of Meiji Constitution).
The primary objective of the MeUi Ishin (Ishin means "here are new things") was the modern-
ization of Japan's social and political structure. Y. NODA, supra note 12, at 42. The govern-
ment accomplished these goals by embracing Western notions of modern capitalism. Id.
46. Uematsu, supra note 45, at 569. Japan became the eighth country to adopt a national
income tax, following the lead of Great Britain, Switzerland, Prussia, the United States, Italy,
Serbia, and South Australia. Id. at 569 n.7. But see S. SURREY, supra note 11, at 2-3 (explaining
that in 1872 United States government repealed income tax enacted during Civil War and
relied on tax revenues from indirect taxes until 1913).
47. See Uematsu, supra note 42, at 569 (discussing tendency of Japanese law to borrow
from Western countries). Despite the abolition of the United States income tax in 1872, many
political groups urged adoption of a new income tax, finally enacted in 1913. S. SURREY, Supra
note 11, at 3.
48. Uematsu, supra note 45, at 570.
49. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 95 (6th ed.
1988) (describing double taxation resulting when corporation incurs corporate income tax on
dividends paid to shareholders and individual shareholders simultaneously incur individual
income tax on dividends received from corporation).
50. O'Keefe, supra note 2, at 406.
51. Id.
52. See Shavell, Taxation Reform in OccupiedJapan, I NAT'L TAxJ. 127, 129 (1948) (discuss-
ing inflation, commodity shortages, labor unrest, and underground "black market" economy
that resulted from large government deficit for year in which World War II ended). The
government suffered a government deficit of 56% of national income for fiscal 1946. Id. at
129; see also id. at 131 (noting that marginal income tax rates immediately following World
War II ranged from 55-97%).
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ing the war,53 inflation soared to an all time high,54 and a large
group of Japanese businesses formed an elite cartel known as the
"Zaibatsu," which controlled the entire Japanese economy. 55
Although the existing tax system taxed both "direct" and "indi-
rect" 56 tax bases at inordinately high rates, taxpayer compliance was
notoriously low, and revenues were inadequate.57 Initial efforts to
reform the Japanese tax system in 1946 met the nation's short-term
objectives but failed to consider long-term goals.58 Subsequently,
the Allies sought to overhaul the entire Japanese tax structure, but
various economic, social, and administrative factors undermined
these reforms and ultimately led to the current disdain for value-
added taxation. 59
1. The 1946-1947 tax reforms
The Allied occupation following World War II supervised a mas-
sive tax reform effort in 1946 designed to rebuild the Japanese
economy.60 The two most important reforms to the heavily in-
debted Japanese government were the Capital Levy, a tax on wealth,
and the War Indemnity Special Tax, which was actually a scheme to
release the Japanese government from its obligation to repay war
debts. 61 The government also narrowed income tax rates, from
53. Id. at 133. War debts included unpaid claims from war damages and government
contract terminations, insurance claims and other war indemnities, and claims by private
banks for defaults on loans secured by the Japanese government. Id.
54. Id. at 129-31.
55. See Kanazawa, The Regulation of Corporate Enterprise: The Law of Unfair Competition and
the Control of Monopoly Power, in LAw IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SociETy 480,
484 (A. von Mehren ed. 1963) (explaining that dissolution of Zaibatsu was one of principal
objectives of Allied occupation). Tax analysts urged the government to use the tax structure
to break up the Zaibatsu. See infra notes 61 & 75 and accompanying text (discussing uses of
tax structure to eliminate Zaibatsu).
56. Shavell, supra note 51, at 130-31 (illustrating tax rates for 1940 through 1945). Be-
tween 1945 and 1948, the following indirect taxes were all in effect at one time or another:
liquor, beer, and sake taxes, commodity tax, admissions tax, textile excise tax, horse-racing
tax, sugar excise tax, haircut and beauty parlor tax, soft drink tax, transportation tax, tonnage
tax, building construction tax, amusement and recreation tax, stamp tax, and other minor
taxes. Id. at 130. By 1947, the national government relied less on indirect taxes, although the
local governments relied more on indirect taxes at that time. Id.
57. Shavell, supra note 51, at 131, 141.
58. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (describing 1946 reform),
59. See infra notes 64-87 and accompanying text (discussing Shoup Mission).
60. Shavell, supra note 51, at 141. The Allied occupation supplied military teams that
supported the tax reform and encouraged taxpayer compliance. Id. The allied nations rebuilt
Japan to a point where, less than 50 years later, it has economically surpassed many of the
nations involved in the post-war reconstruction. See MERRILL LYNCH, supra note 3 (noting that
economic growth in Japan has surpassed that of EEC nations since 1981). In fact, Japan's
growing economic strength is one of the major factors behind the EEC unification in 1992.
Id.
61. Shavell, supra note 51, at 132-33. The government imposed the Capital Levy mainly
to eliminate the power of the Zaibatsu. The War Indemnity Special Tax was actually a form of
cancellation of indebtedness whereby tax liability would be cancelled by releasing the govern-
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fifty-five percent to ninety-seven percent, in pre-reform 1946, to
twenty percent to eighty-five percent, in 1947,62 and transferred
some of the national indirect taxes to the local governments. 65 De-
spite these short-term modifications to the existing tax structure, Ja-
pan still needed a permanent tax system to provide the economic
support necessary to rebuild the country during the latter half of the
twentieth century.
2. The recommendations of the Shoup Mission
The Report on Japanese Taxation prepared by the Shoup Mis-
sion64 in 1949 set forth a plan to meet the objectives of the Allied
occupation, 65 stabilize the Japanese economy, 66 and create the most
modern system of national taxation in the world-all to be drafted
in five months.67 The most fascinating aspect of the Shoup Mis-
sion's recommendations, however, does not lie in its grand ambi-
tion, but in its proposal for Japan to adopt the enterprise tax, the
first broad-based VAT in the world.68
The Diet adopted the 1950 VAT at an extraordinary session con-
vened specifically to consider it.69 The Diet, however, delayed im-
plementing the tax until 1954 when the government finally repealed
the tax due to pressures from groups expecting to be hit heavily by
the VAT levy.70 The 1950 VAT, like the 1989 CT, appeared innocu-
ous, but generated great public outrage after its adoption.71 It was a
ment from its obligation to repay war debts that may be owed to the taxpayer. Id at 133; see
also I.R.C. § 108(a)(1) (1986) (excluding debt discharges from gross income when discharge
results from bankruptcy).
62. Shavell, supra note 51, at 131.
63. Id. at 139.
64. See Sundelson, Report on Japanese Taxation by the Shoup Mission, 3 NAT'L TAxJ. 104, 105
(1950) (reviewing findings of Shoup Mission). Professor Carl Shoup headed the 1949 study in
Japan. Dean Howard R. Bowen, Professor William S. Vickrey, Professor Jerome B. Cohen,
Mr. Rolland F. Hatfield, Professor Stanley S. Surrey, and Professor William C. Warren as-
sisted Professor Shoup as well. Id. at 105-06 n.2.
65. O'Keefe, supra note 2, at 406-07.
66. Sundelson, supra note 64, at 106 (explaining that Shoup Mission was part of overall
plan by allies to stabilize economy).
67. Bronfenbrenner & Kogiku, The Aftermath of the Shoup Tax Reform, Part I, 10 NAT'L TAX
J. 236, 237 (1957); see infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (revealing reasons for ultimate
demise of Shoup reforms).
68. Turnier, supra note 3, at 436 n.2. Some other recommendations of the Shoup Mis-
sion (which the Diet later enacted) include a dividends-received exemption for corporations, a
dividends-received credit (25%) for individuals, and a repeal of preferential capital gains tax
rates. O'Keefe, supra note 2, at 406; Uematsu, supra note 45, at 611-12. This Comment refers
to the enterprise tax as the 1950 VAT.
69. Uematsu, supra note 42, at 578, 578 n.69 (citing Local Tax Law, arts. 23-74 of 1950).
As with the 1989 CT, there appears to have been very little debate prior to the enactment of
the VAT scheme. Bronfenbrenner & Kogiku, supra note 67, at 254.
70. Bronfenbrenner & Kogiku, supra note 67, at 254. Law No. 95 of 1954 repealed the
VAT. Uematsu, supra note 45, at 578 n.69.
71. See infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text (noting reasons for ultimate failure of
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sales-subtractive VAT 72 that, unlike the national CT passed in 1989,
was a local tax designed to replace the business activity or enterprise
tax.75 The Shoup Mission recommended a VAT, in lieu of a retail
sales tax, in an effort to spare the typically small Japanese retailer7 4
and to place the burden of tax compliance on large producers and
distributors. 75
Several economic, social, and administrative factors account for
the failure of both the 1950 VAT and many of the Shoup Mission
recommendations in general. The unresponsiveness of the Allies to
Japanese public opinion was a principal factor in this failure.7 6 First,
farmers and other consumers feared that the VAT would cause
higher prices for consumer goods because producers and distribu-
tors would simply pass the tax burden through the chain of produc-
tion and distribution.7 7 Second, small businesses believed that the
administrative and compliance costs of the VAT would be too great
for them to bear.78 Third, Japanese labor organizations and polit-
ical parties inherently distrusted the VAT because they believed that
it promoted the employment of machines rather than people.79
1950 VAT); see also supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text (discussing public's criticisms of
1989 CT).
72. Schenk, supra note 6, at 1627; see supra note 4 and accompanying text (defining tax
base of sales-subtractive VAT). An amendment to the tax allowed certain industries (private
railroads, shipping industries, banks, insurance companies, warehousing, and others) to use,
in lieu of the credit-subtractive method, an arbitrary percentage of gross income from sales as
the tax base. Bronfenbrenner, supra note 4, at 312. The members of the Shoup Mission op-
posed this amendment. Id. at 313 n.22. A later amendment, in 1953, permitted use of the
addition method instead of the credit-subtractive method. C. SULLIVAN, THE TAX ON VALUE
ADDED 147 (1965). This combination of VAT methods proved confusing to the Japanese. Id.
73. Uematsu, supra note 45, at 578. The business activity or enterprise tax was a local
tax, the revenues from which went to the prefectures. Bronfenbrenner, supra note 4, at 299.
A prefecture is the Japanese equivalent of a state in the United States. Id. The government
enacted the business activity tax in 1878. It split into two taxes, the local enterprise tax and
the national enterprise profits tax, in 1896. Uematsu, supra note 45, at 577. The government
based the local tax on such factors as sales, building rent, capital, and number of employees.
The national tax used business profits as the tax base (as did the tax prior to the 1896 split).
Id. In 1940, the two taxes were recombined into a single local tax. Id. at 578. The tax became
the business activity tax in 1948. Id. The tax is still in effect. J. PECHMAN, supra note 16, at
425.
74. See Bronfenbrenner, supra note 4, at 300 (noting burdens on retailers of complying
with VAT). Apparently, the Shoup Mission concluded that there were too many small retailers
for the effective enforcement of such a tax. Bronfenbrenner & Kogiku, supra note 67, at 241.
75. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (explaining this burden actually furthered
post-war objective of discouraging Zaibatsu). Large businesses objected to the VAT, claiming
an inability to pass on the tax in full. Bronfenbrenner, supra note 4, at 310-11.
76. Bronfenbrenner & Kogiku, The Aftermath of the Shoup Tax Reforms, Part II, 10 NAT'L
TAXJ. 345, 359 (1950) (explaining that Shoup Mission proposed reforms without considering
Japanese public opinion).
77. Id. at 353; see infra notes 173-83 and accompanying text (noting effect of VATs on
consumers).
78. Bronfenbrenner, supra note 4, at 307-08.
79. Id. at 311. This was an unsophisticated way of claiming that the VAT was not say-
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Culturally, the major goal of the Shoup Mission, to create a mod-
em tax system, was an unrealistic objective. Japan's homogenous
society considered immediately suspect any system created by gaijin
(foreigners).s8 In addition, the rapid deterioration of relations be-
tween the Allied occupiers and the Japanese people heightened dis-
approval of the Shoup Mission recommendations. 8 '
Various administrative problems also undermined the Shoup Mis-
sion recommendations. For instance, most Japanese people did not
understand the term "value-added tax," which translated literally to
fuka-kachi-zei, a term that some interpreted to mean "double tax" or
"tax on gross income."8 2 Also, technical deficiencies were inevita-
ble because the Shoup Mission drafted its recommendations in only
five months.8 3 Finally, the report predicted its own demise when it
warned that the Shoup Mission recommendations were indivisible:
the Diet should either enact all or none of the proposals to maxi-
mize economic reform.84
The Shoup Mission may have failed in its quest to establish the
most modern tax system in the world, but it succeeded, at least par-
tially, in its effort to "American-ize" the Japanese tax system.8 5
Both the United States and Japan relied predominantly on revenues
from direct taxes, such as the income tax, rather than on indirect
consumption taxes, such as the European VAT.8 6 Tax policies of
the United States and Japan were similar until 1986, when the
United States government lowered marginal tax rates and substan-
tially broadened the income tax base.8 7
C. Living With the Consequences of Shoup: Modern Japanese Tax Policy
During the period after the Shoup Mission and before the 1988
tax reform, there were more similarities than differences between
Japanese and American tax policies. Both nations relied more on
income taxes than on indirect taxes such as the VAT,88 indicating a
ings-neutral. See infra note 178 (referring to VAT as means to encourage savings and discour-
age immediate consumption).
80. Bronfenbrenner & Kogiku, supra note 76, at 359.
81. Id.
82. Bronfenbrenner, supra note 4, at 298-99.
83. Bronfenbrenner & Kogiku, supra note 76, at 359 (noting that "[s]even Supermen"
could not have produced document as voluminous as Shoup Mission reports without some
technical deficiencies).
84. Sundelson, supra note 64, at 106.
85. See Uematsu, supra note 45, at 580 (contending Shoup Mission reports reflect Ameri-
can ideal).
86. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (noting degree to which United States, Ja-
pan, and several European nations relied on indirect taxes).
87. See McLure, supra note 8, at 1518 (discussing impact of Tax Reform Act of 1986).
88. Pechman, supra note 38, at 246.
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mutual preference for a progressive and relatively broad tax base.
They both seemed willing, however, to sacrifice some of that broad-
ness to maintain the progressive structure of an income tax, rather
than to adopt the regressive structure of a VAT.89 The two systems
of taxation diverged during the 1980s, enabling Japan to change its
traditional world tax policy role from student of the West to sense/
(teacher) .90
By 1980, Japan was considering re-introducing the VAT to raise
substantial revenues at low tax rates. 91 Although these efforts
failed, the VAT reappeared in a 1985-86 tax reform proposal
designed to replace the confusing commodity tax.92 The 1986 VAT
sought to "neutralize" the indirect tax system so that different prod-
ucts and services would be taxed at identical rates.9 3 In addition,
the government intended to use VAT revenues to fund reductions in
corporate and individual income tax rates.9 4 These efforts also
failed, in part because the law required taxable enterprises to obtain
code numbers from the tax office, which could, and likely would, be
used as registration numbers for other majorJapanese taxes.95 De-
spite this well-entrenched history as a no-VAT country, former
Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita endorsed passage of the 1989 CT
law.9 6
II. THE CONSUMPTION TAX LAW
The Japanese CT law advances traditional VAT concepts. It is
one of the few single rate VATs employed in the world 97 and its
current incarnation exempts very few items and activities from tax
liability. In addition, its simplified record-keeping requirements and
preferential treatment for small- and medium-sized businesses pro-
mote taxpayer compliance.
89. See Aaron, supra note 5, at 1114 (explaining regressive tax takes proportionally more
from low-income groups than from high-income groups).
90. The United States Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) exemplifies a reinforced belief by
the federal government in the structure of the income tax. Zodrow, A Direct Consumption Tax As
an "Add-On " Tax, 38 TAx NoTEs 1389, 1389 (1988); cf. McLure, supra note 8, at 1518 (reason-
ing that VAT is more likely in post-TRA United States). The TRA lowered marginal tax rates
and substantially broadened the income tax base by, inter alia, limiting the Individual Retire-
ment Account [hereinafter IRA] deduction and eliminating the preferential capital gains tax,
thereby expressing a preference for broad-based taxation. Id.
91. A. TArr, supra note 1, at 36.
92. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (describing recently repealed commodity
taxes).
93. J. PECHMAN, supra note 16, at 431.
94. A. TArr, supra note 1, at 36.
95. Id. at 36-37. Japanese taxpayers resented using one tax to enforce another. Id. at 37.
96. Schenk, supra note 6, at 1626.
97. A. TArr, supra note 1, at 39.
1278
1991] THE JAPANESE CONSUMPTION TAX 1279
A. How Does One Compute Net Tax Liability?
The CT is a variation of the credit-subtractive method used
predominantly in the EEC.98 The taxpayer computes output tax lia-
bility99 by multiplying taxable sales'00 by the standard three percent
tax rate.10' The taxpayer then computes the net tax by reducing the
output tax liability by the amount of taxes paid on qualifying
purchases. 10 2 The law also allows the taxpayer deductions against
output tax liability for: (1) sales returns and allowances, discounts,
rebates, and other refunds; 10 3 (2) uncollectible trade receivables,
i.e., bad debts; 10 4 and (3) excise and other taxes paid as of April 1,
1989, on goods in distribution or inventory.' 0 5
Some businesses may use several available alternative calculations
to determine their net CT liability. First, when a taxpayer makes
nontaxable sales 10 6 exceeding five percent of total sales, the tax-
payer computes its input tax credit by either of two simplified calcu-
98. See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text (noting differences between EEC VATs
and CT).
99. See supra note 6 (explaining computation of output tax).
100. Japanese CT § 3. The tax base is either sales price (including other indirect taxes)
for domestic transactions or delivery price (including duty, other indirect taxes, freight and
insurance) for imported goods. ARTHUR YOUNG, JAPANESE CONSUMPnON TAx 6 (1989) (out-
line of CT law available from Ernst & Young, Tokyo, Japan).
101. Japanese CT §§ 4, 7(1)(a). The three percent rate is the lowest VAT rate in the
world. Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 113. The CT rate for most automobiles and other
passenger vehicles is six percent until March 31, 1992. Japanese CT § 4. This is still substan-
tially lower than the commodity tax rate previously levied against automobiles and other pas-
senger vehicles. Five Japan Carmakers to Cut Domestic Retail Prices, The Reuters Bus. Rep., Mar.
24, 1989 (Lexis, Nexis library, Bus. Rpt. file). The government classified automobiles as class
two commodities under the former commodity tax system. See supra note 39 (listing examples
of class one and class two commodities under commodity tax system).
102. Japanese CT § 7(1)(a). All purchases corresponding to taxable sales are creditable,
qualifying purchases. ARTHUR YOUNG, supra note 100, at 10. When a taxpayer initially records
a purchase in its books of account, the taxpayer debits an expense account and credits cash or
accounts payable. Schenk, supra note 6, at 1627. The amount recorded in the taxpayer's
accounting records includes any potentially creditable CT paid to the supplier. Id. Under the
CT system, purchases, as debited in the taxpayer's bookkeeping system, multiplied by 3/103
(the denominator of 103 reverses out the CT already included in the gross purchases
amount), yields the input tax credit. Id.; accord, ARTHUR YOUNG, supra note 100, at 10 (demon-
strating CT calculations).
For purposes of determining the period in which taxable sales and purchases occur, the CT
law generally requires that taxpayers use the accrual method of accounting. Schenk, Policy
Issues, supra note 4, at 118. The accrual method recognizes income when earned, not neces-
sarily received, and expenses when incurred, not necessarily paid. S. SURREY, supra note 11, at
615-16.
103. Japanese CT § 7(2). The taxpayer takes the deduction in the tax period when the
discount or other refund is made. Id.
104. Id. § 7(3).
105. Id. § 11(2). This provision is a transitional measure designed to appease taxpayers.
The proposed Value Added Tax Act contains a similar provision. Value Added Tax Act
§ 4040; see A. SCHENK, COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 189-90 (commenting that section 4040 is
potential administrative nightmare).
106. SeeJapanese CT §§ 6(1)-(1 1) (describing nontaxable sales); see also infra notes 128-30
and accompanying text (listing tax exempt items under CT law).
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lations designed to accurately reflect CT paid on taxable sales.10 7
Second, a small or medium-sized business enterprise with taxable
sales not exceeding 500 million yen ($3.8 million) may reduce its
output tax liability by an estimated input tax credit equal to eighty
percent of taxes paid on taxable sales.108
The credit-subtractive VAT used in the EEC requires the taxpayer
to substantiate the claimed input tax credit with supporting tax in-
voices.' 0 9 These invoices must show, among other things, the
amount of VAT paid by the purchaser to the seller as part of the
purchase price of a product or service. I10 Theoretically, the invoice
method provides an audit trail by which the government can verify
the accuracy of the input tax credit.1 1 '
In contrast, the Japanese CT law uses an account-based or books
of account method that allows the taxpayer to use its existing ac-
counting system to substantiate claimed input tax credits. 112 This
method recognizes the inconvenience to businesses of changing
their billing systems to accommodate the requirements of the in-
voice method.113
107. Japanese CT §§ 7(1)(b)(i)-(ii). The two methods are: (1) the itemized method in
section 7(l)(b)(i), and (2) the proportional method in section 7(1)(b)(ii). Id. Each method
computes output tax liability like the general formula. See supra notes 99-101 and accompany-
ing text (outlining formula and discussing elements). The calculation of the input tax credit
under the itemized method is as follows: tax paid on purchases corresponding to taxable sales
plus the product of purchases corresponding to both taxable and nontaxable sales multiplied
by 3/103, multiplied by taxable sales over total taxable and nontaxable sales. Japanese CT
§ 7(1)(b)(i). There is an optional method of allocating between taxes paid on taxable and
nontaxable sales that the NTA must approve in advance. Id. The tax authorities base this
allocation on factors such as the number of employees and floor space. Id. The calculation of
the input tax credit under proportional method is as follows: CT paid on qualifying purchases
multiplied by the quotient of taxable sales divided by total sales. Id. § 7(l)(b)(ii); see Schenk,
supra note 6, at 1629-30 (demonstrating CT calculations).
108. Japanese CT § 8(3). For wholesalers, the applicable percentage of deemed
purchases is 90%. Id. This election is irrevocable for two years. Id.
109. A. TArr, supra note 1, at 279-80.
110. Tax invoices in the EEC usually include the names and addresses of both the pur-
chaser and seller, the seller's VAT registration number, the invoice number and date, the
shipping or supply date (when different from the invoice date), a description of the goods or
services, purchase price excluding VAT, the applicable VAT rate, and VAT charged to the
purchaser at each of these rates. Id.
111. See Turnier, supra note 3, at 460-61 (providing examples of invoice method). But see
Schenk, Value Added Tax, supra note 4, at 286 (revealing fallacy of supposed benefit of invoice
method). European tax scholars initially perceived the VAT as a means to increase taxpayer
compliance. Id. However, civil servants in the tax system find general VAT administration,
including verifying timely filings of returns and reviewing propriety of refund claims, so time-
consuming that cross-checking invoices, to verify that the input tax credit claimed by the pur-
chaser equals the VAT charged by the seller, is impractical. Id.
112. Japanese CT § 7(1)(c); see infra notes 149-64 and accompanying text (discussing ac-
count-based feature of CT).
113. Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 112, 118.
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B. Who Pays the Tax?
The government imposes the CT on the value of goods and serv-
ices consumed in Japan. 114 The law subjects both goods and serv-
ices sold or leased to Japanese businesses by other Japanese
businesses and goods and services imported into Japan to the tax.' 15
Ultimate tax liability rests with the business enterprise that sells or
leases goods and services to other domestic businesses."16 The re-
cipient of imported goods is ultimately liable for the tax on receipt
of the goods from bonded warehouses. 117
C. Who Does Not Pay the Tax?
The government does not tax all business enterprises. An entity
may be either wholly or partially exempt from the tax or be engaged
in an activity that is zero-rated under the law. 118 An exempt enter-
prise is treated as "outside" the tax system. 1 9 An exempt organiza-
tion, therefore, may not claim a refund for VAT paid to suppliers. 120
An enterprise engaged in a zero-rated activity is part of the tax sys-
tem; the taxpayer's rate of tax is simply zero. 121 Thus, an organiza-
tion engaged in a zero-rated activity, such as exporting, 22 may
114. Japanese CT § 1. The concept of a tax jurisdiction imposing tax only on goods and
services consumed in that jurisdiction is known as the destination principle. Schenk, supra
note 6, at 1627; see infra notes 219-28 and accompanying text (describing zero-rating of ex-
ports under destination principle VAT). In contrast, the 1950 VAT would have imposed the
tax based on the origin principle. C. SULLIVAN, THE TAX ON VALUE ADDED 146 (1965); see
Cnossen, The Irrelevance of the Restricted Origin Principle, 20 TAX NoTEs 521, 522 (1983) (describ-
ing origin principle as confining tax liability to value-added within applicable tax jurisdiction).
The EEC rejected a recent proposal that its member nations move to the origin principle after
the EEC unification in 1992. DuBois, EC Ministers Agree to End Border Checks, Wall St. J., Oct.
10, 1989, at A15, col. 3.
115. Japanese CT § 1. Only transfers of assets for valid consideration are taxable domes-
tic transactions. ARTHUR YOUNG, supra note 100, at 4. Domestic transactions subject to the
CT include transfers of tangible and intangible property, performance of services, and leasing
activities. Id. Import transactions are taxable even when there is no valid consideration. Im-
port transactions subject to the tax include only tangible assets. Id.
116. Japanese CT § 2. The Japanese government exempts casual sales from the CT. AR-
THUR YOUNG, supra note 100, at 2. In contrast, the recently proposed Value Added Tax Act in
the United States would impose VAT on certain casual, i.e., nonbusiness, sales where the dol-
lar amount of the sale exceeded some de minimis threshold. See infra notes 266-67 and accom-
panying text (discussing tax on certain nonbusiness sales).
117. Japanese CT § 2. The recipient of imported goods ordinarily must pay the corre-
sponding tax liability before receipt of the goods. Id. § 9(2). However, the taxpayer may
defer payment of the tax in one of two ways. First, the taxpayer may place the goods in a
bonded warehouse area, in which case the tax will be due before the goods are withdrawn
from the bonded area. Id. Second, the taxpayer may post collateral, in which case the tax
payment may be deferred for up to three months. Id.
118. A. TArr, supra note 1, at 49-60.
119. Id. at 49.
120. Chiu & Siegel, supra note 4, at 5.
121. A. TArT, supra note 1, at 49.
122. Japanese CT § 5.
1282 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 40:1265
credit the VAT paid to its suppliers, which may actually entitle it to a
net CT refund.123
1. Zero-rating of exports
Exporting is the only zero-rated activity in the Japanese CT legis-
lation.124 It is entirely consistent with a destination principle VAT
such as the CT to zero-rate exports. 125 The exporter does not pay
tax on the value added to goods and services, 126 yet claims credits
for VAT paid to suppliers. 127
2. Wholly and partially exempt transactions
Several types of entities engaged in otherwise taxable activities
are exempt from the CT. 128 The government provides some ex-
emptions to promote certain activities, such as the exemption
designed to promote the sale of government securities. 129 Other
exemptions exist simply because the government already imposes a
more effective tax on that item than the CT.130
The CT legislation relieves small and medium-sized business en-
terprises from paying all or part of their potential tax liability. First,
the law exempts those enterprises with taxable sales during the base
period of less than thirty million yen ($231,000) from paying the
123. Chiu & Siegel, supra note 4, at 5. This would occur if the enterprise engaged in only
zero-rated activities or in a greater proportion of zero-rated activities than non-zero-rated
taxable activities.
124. Japanese CT § 5. Although the CT legislation refers to exporting as an exempt
transaction, as opposed to a zero-rated activity, the CT law treats exports as if they were zero-
rated by allowing exporters to deduct CT paid to suppliers. Id.; see also Main Points of Tax
Reform, supra note 2, § 4(l)(3) (describing zero-rating of exports).
125. See infra notes 219-28 and accompanying text (discussing zero-rating of exports
under CT).
126. When services are performed both inside and outside the tax jurisdiction, the taxing
jurisdiction must decide whether or not to impose VAT on that transaction. See TRAC Act
§ 4006(b)(2) (proposing de minimis-type rule for services performed both inside and outside
United States taxjurisdiction). This rule would impose VAT on services when more than 50%
of such services were performed in the tax jurisdiction. Id.
127. Japanese CT § 5.
128. See A. TArr, supra note 1, at 51 (describing legislative process of deciding what activi-
ties should be taxed, exempt, or zero-rated as theoretically simple but practically impossible).
Public policy is often the principal motivation underlying tax code provisions. See S. SURREY,
supra note 11, at 46 (listing promotion of socially desirable objectives as one of goals of tax
system). Both the United States and Japanese tax codes allow deductions for socially moti-
vated reasons, such as the deductions available for casualty losses, medical expenses, and
charitable contributions. Compare J. PECHMAN, supra note 16, at 407-08 (listing deductions
under Japanese income tax code) with I.R.C. §§ 165(h), 213 & 170 (1986) (allowing deduc-
tions for casualty losses, medical care, and charitable contributions, respectively).
129. Japanese CT § 6(2).
130. SeeJapanese CT § 6(6) (exempting stamp sales from CT liability). The government
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tax.13 1 These enterprises may elect to register for the tax so that
businesses with net input credits may claim refunds.13 2 Second,
business enterprises with taxable salesa33 between thirty and sixty
million yen ($231,000 and $462,000) may claim a marginal or par-
tial exemption from tax liability. 13 4
III. ANALYSIS
Every system of taxation balances efficiency, equity, and simplic-
ity.' 3 5 An efficient tax structure minimizes the number of taxpay-
ers,' 36 the number of difficult decisions that a taxpayer must
make, 37 administrative burdens and documentation require-
ments, 3 8 and the taxpayer's need to rely on tax professionals in
complying with the law.' 3 9 An equitable tax structure imposes tax
equally among equals (horizontal equity) and proportionally among
revised the stamp tax in lieu of abolishing it and imposing the CT on stamps. Main Points of
Tax Reform, supra note 2, § 4(2)(3). A complete listing of exempt transactions follows:
(1) Sale or lease of land and rights relating to land (i.e., easements),
(2) Sale of securities, corporate bonds, limited partnership shares, certificates of deposit
and certain other investments,
(3) Transfers of currency,
(4) Interest on loans receivable, guarantee fees, insurance premiums and certain other
items,
(5) Sale of certain government-sponsored gambling and lottery tickets,
(6) Sale of stamps at "designated places",
(7) International transactions involving money orders, foreign currency and money
transfers,
(8) Provision of certain prescribed services related to immigration,
(9) Provision of medical care (services and treatment) covered by certain types of insur-
ance,
(10) Certain types of welfare, and
(11) Tuition and fees for school entrance examinations.
Japanese CT § 6.
131. Id. § 8(1) (defining as third year before the current tax year for sole proprietors,
partnerships, and corporations with fiscal year of one year).
132. Id. A net input credit arises when VAT paid on purchases exceeds VAT collected on
sales. See Schenk, Value Added Tax, supra note 4, at 238-39 (stating input tax credit is related to
use of item by item preferences and giving examples of calculations). Exempt enterprises do
not collect VAT on their sales, but do pay the tax on purchases. Id. Accordingly, these busi-
nesses have refundable net input credits. Id
133. Japanese Ct. § 8(1)-(2). This is net of taxes. Id.
134. Id. § 8(2). The taxpayer computes tax liability as if it were not entitled to any prefer-
ential treatment and multiplies the resulting tax liability by the fraction of taxable sales less 30
million yen divided by 30 million yen. Enterprises that use the simplified tax scheme for small
and medium-sized businesses (discussion supra note 107 and accompanying text) may also
exercise this marginal exemption. Id.
135. S. SURREY, supra note 11, at 46-47.
136. Turner, VAT Minimizing Administration and Compliance Costs, 38 TAx NoTEs 1257, 1262-
67 (1988) (naming reduction in number of taxpayers in tax payment system as means to
achieve efficiency goals).
137. Id. at 1263.
138. Id. at 1265.
139. Id. at 1267.
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nonequals (vertical equity). 140
Notions of equity permeate the basic goals of a tax system. These
goals include the redistribution of wealth indirectly through transfer
payments or directly through the tax system, 14' the stimulation or
deflation of the economy by manipulating tax rates, 142 the promo-
tion of socially desirable objectives, 43 the promotion of economic
and investment objectives,' 44 and the deterrence of certain activi-
ties.145 A simple tax structure has attributes of both an efficient and
equitable tax system. Taxing authorities achieve a simple tax struc-
ture when they minimize the costs of administering the tax and the
taxpayer's costs of complying with its requirements. 46
The CT law presents a novel approach to the trichotomy between
efficiency, equity, and simplicity by easing typical VAT compliance
costs while raising substantial tax revenues. The CT drafters may
have created some unanticipated problems, however, in failing to
promote the tax effectively prior to its April 1989 implementa-
tion. 147 The following analysis of the CT law focuses on the unique
140. Gravelle, Assessing a Value-Added Tax: Efficiency and Equity, 38 TAx NOTES 1117, 1118-20
(1988).
141. S. SURREY, supra note 11, at 46. The Medicare system is an example of wealth redis-
tribution vis-a-vis transfer payments. Id. The earned income credit, a dollar-for-dollar tax
reduction for low-income groups subject to a phase-out as the earned income of the individ-
ual increases, is an example of wealth redistribution. I.R.C. § 32 (1986); see infra notes 215-18
and accompanying text (suggesting credit system patterned after earned income credit to
combat regressivity of CT).
142. S. SURREY, supra note 11, at 46.
143. Id. The deduction for charitable contributions available in both the United States
and Japan exemplifies this objective.
144. S. SURREY, supra note 11, at 46. The preferential 207o tax rate for capital gains on
the disposition of securities in the 1988 Japanese tax reform represents a policy decision by
the Japanese taxing authorities to promote investment in the private sector.
145. S. SURREY, supra note 11, at 46. The taxation of so-called illegal income (i.e., money
received during illegal activities such as gambling) exemplifies this policy objective. I.R.C.
§ 61 (1986); see C. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 50-51 (1977) (proposing
imposition of tax on sulfur dioxide polluters to discourage sulfur dioxide pollution).
146. S. SURREY, supra note 11, at 47. Administrative costs include the costs incurred in
processing tax returns, examining returns for accuracy, policing prompt filings and tax pay-
ments, educating the public, and other administrative functions. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
supra note 4, at 111-22. Recent estimates in the United States indicate the potential adminis-
trative burden of a VAT. See id. at 111, 121 (estimating that VAT would require IRS to hire
20,000 additional employees and incur annual administrative costs of $700 million).
Costs of compliance include those costs necessary to complete tax returns, compile and
maintain adequate accounting records, and retain professional tax advice. Such costs do not
include opportunity costs, i.e., costs of foregone alternatives, associated with payment of the
tax, costs of the effect of the tax on consumption and production, and psychological costs
generated by the public's general fear of taxation. Sandford, What it Costs to Pay Tax, AccT.
140 (Feb. 1989).
147. See Brauchli, They'll See Results When Viewers Go Out to Replace Smashed TVs, Wall St.J.,
Nov. 3, 1989, at BI, col. 1 (describing unsuccessful television and print advertising campaign
begun October 1989 to promote CT). Japanese consumers apparently do not understand the
CT. The best evidence of this lies in their alliance with theJSP. Lehner, In Japan, supra note
15, at A10, col. 1. The JSP advocates replacing the CT with a series of commodity taxes
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characteristics of the tax, including its use of the account-based
method, and argues that such innovations are superior to VAT con-
cepts employed in other existing VAT legislation. Finally, this anal-
ysis compares the CT law to two recent United States VAT
proposals and argues that the CT is a more realistic approach to
VAT policy than these American proposals.
A. Efficiency of the CT Law: The Account-Based Feature of the CT
The account-based feature of the Japanese CT sacrifices ease of
administration for ease of compliance. By relying on an enterprise's
books of account, in lieu of tax invoices, the CT minimizes the com-
pliance burdens inherent in an invoice system. In this respect, the
tax is an efficient levy which, by its simplicity, promotes adherence
to the requirements of the law.148
1. Benefits and critiques of the account-based method
The account-based method is less burdensome than the invoice
method. Thus, taxpayers do not need as much time between adop-
tion and implementation of the tax to establish new accounting pro-
cedures. 149 Accordingly, governments may implement the tax more
quickly than they could implement an invoice method VAT. 150 The
account-based method may also reduce the administrative costs nec-
essary to educate the public about the tax. In exchange for these
benefits, however, some analysts contend that the CT adds signifi-
cant administrative detriments.
Proponents of the invoice method argue that the tax invoice re-
quirement deters tax evasion because it provides tax authorities with
a means to cross-check the claimed input tax credit against the ap-
plicable amounts listed on supplier issued sales invoices. 15 1 In addi-
similar to the taxes that the LDP designed the CT to replace. See supra note 39 and accompa-
nying text (describing indirect commodity taxes).
148. See Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 118-20 (explaining that one advantage of
account-based method is relatively low compliance costs); see also supra note 17 and accompa-
nying text (indicating that many large businesses support CT); cf. Guttman, supra note 2, at
1017 (explaining that small businesses, farmers, and doctors find CT objectionable despite
these alleged compliance breakthroughs).
149. See Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 118 (noting existence of time advantage).
150. Id. TheJapanese government implemented the CT law only three months after the
Diet adopted the tax. See Schenk, supra note 6, at 1626 (disclosing that CT passed Diet on
December 24, 1988 and became effective on April 1, 1989); Kyodo News Service, Nov. 16,
1988 (news summary) (Lexis, Nexis library, Int'l file) (reporting that Japanese House of Rep-
resentatives passed CT bill on November 16, 1988). The United States government estimates
that it would require at least 18 months to implement an invoice method VAT subsequent to
its adoption. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, supra note 4, at 122.
151. See Turnier, supra note 3, at 460-61 (arguing that abandonment of invoice system
would result in loss of information on taxable status).
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tion, these analysts contend that the account-based system actually
enhances the taxpayer's opportunities to'avoid paying tax by al-
lowing taxpayers to compute the input tax credit based on
"deemed" qualifying purchases instead of actual qualifying
purchases. 152
Finally, some critics maintain that the account-based feature con-
verts the credit-subtractive VAT from a transactional tax to a period
tax. 15 Without invoices, an account-based, credit-subtractive VAT
is incapable of accommodating multiple VAT rates and, thus, tax-
payers can only calculate VAT at a certain point in time and at only
one rate. 154 In a multiple rate account-based system, taxpayers
would be unable to compute accurately VAT liability fiom their ac-
counting records because their records do not encompass the neces-
sary detail of supplier issued tax invoices. 155
2. Response to critiques of account-based method
European practice illustrates the fallacy inherent in these criti-
ques. Although the invoice method does deter tax evasion in the-
ory, the majority of countries currently using the invoice method
find general VAT administration so time-consuming that cross-
checking invoices to claimed input tax credits, absent clear evidence
of taxpayer fraud, is virtually impossible.' 56 In fact, the account-
based system, in expressly allowing what would clearly be consid-
ered VAT evasion in a European credit-subtractive invoice method
VAT,' 57 alleviates administrative burdens on the tax authorities to
152. Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 116. In computing the input tax credit under the
general CT formula, the taxpayer multiplies 3/103 by the amount of tax inclusive purchases
found in the taxpayer's accounting records. See supra note 102 (discussing computation). The
CT law contemplates that this figure will likely include purchases from exempt suppliers who
actually did not charge the taxpayer any VAT on the sale. SeeJapanese CT § (7)(1)(a) (includ-
ing purchases from tax-exempt enterprises, such as exporters, in taxable purchases). There-
fore, the input tax credit will reflect "deemed" qualifying purchases instead of actual
qualifying purchases. Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 116.
153. See supra note 4 (defining transactional tax as one that applies tax rate to each individ-
ual component of value-added and period tax as one that applies tax rate to net figure repre-
senting value-added at specified time period).
154. A. SCHENK, COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 4-5.
155. See supra note 110 (listing typical contents of tax invoices).
156. Schenk, Value Added Tax, supra note 4, at 286-87; see A. TArr, supra note 1, at 304(naming Korea as only country imposing invoice method VAT to institute policy of cross-
checking invoices).
157. A. TArr, supra note.l, at 308. Some other common forms of VAT evasion include:
failing to register with the VAT authorities; inflating claims for VAT refunds (usually done by
emerging businesses, where it is not unusual for purchases to exceed sales as new businesses
make substantial capital expenditures); overstating the input tax credit by claiming deductions
for purchases corresponding to nontaxable sales; underreporting sales; misdescribing items
in a multiple rate VAT system; and fabricating shipments to places outside the applicable taxjurisdiction for domestic sales, thereby enabling the taxpayer to deduct purchases related to
the sale but not charge VAT to the next purchaser. Id. at 307-14. Generally, a purchaser and
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search for this type of nonpayment of tax.158
Additionally, because tax evasion is unprofitable when tax rates
are low, 15 9 one may justify the account-based feature of the Japa-
nese CT by the fact that the three percent CT rate is the lowest VAT
rate in the world. 160 Therefore, the incidents of tax evasion that will
occur should, in aggregate, involve an insignificant amount. Finally,
the argument that the CT is virtually a period tax, rather than a
transactional tax, is relevant only in a multiple rate system' 6' where
classification of purchases into different categories is both material
and necessary.' 62 This argument is irrelevant to the CT single rate
system,' 63 a superior system to the multiple rate structure used
predominantly in the EEC.164
B. Equity in the CT Law: Elements of Regressivity in the System
One important VAT consideration over the years has been its ef-
fect on consumers.' 65 Although tax scholars originally envisioned
the VAT as a tax on business,166 most business enterprises "fund"
their inability to offset their output tax completely with input credits
by charging a higher price on the product or service.' 67 As busi-
nesses continue to shift the tax burden forward through the chain of
seller must conspire to defraud the government by materially misstating the content of tax
invoices under the invoice method. Schenk, supra note 27, at 357.
158. See Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 118 (stating that compliance benefits of in-
voice VAT may be overstated because agencies responsible for VAT administration lack ade-
quate personnel to conduct full-scale investigations).
159. See Schenk, ValueAdded Tax, supra note 4, at 284 (stating that tax should be imposed
at lowest possible level because taxpayers find evasion unprofitable when rates are low).
When tax rates rise, compliance becomes less profitable and incidents of tax evasion increase.
Id.
160. Japanese CT § 4; Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 113.
161. See Turnier, supra note 136, at 1260 (discussing multiple rate systems). A multiple
rate system imposes a standard VAT rate for most items and either, or both, of the following:
reduced rates for certain necessities, such as food or medical care, or luxury rates for certain
luxury-type goods. Id.
162. McLure, supra note 5, at 976.
163. Japanese CT § 4. This does not include the zero-rating of exports and the six per-
cent transitional rating for passenger vehicles. Id. §§ 4-5.
164. See infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text (discussing superiority of single rate
CT system). For example, Germany uses a 14% general VAT rate but taxes food, books,
periodicals, and art at a preferential seven percent rate. J. PECHMAN, supra note 16, at 265,
278. Of the 12 member nations of the EEC, only Denmark and the United Kingdom employ
the single rate structure. See A. TArr, supra note 1, at 40-41 (listing VAT rates for various
countries).
165. See A. TArr, supra note 1, at 220 (explaining that ideal is efficient VAT because it does
not distort consumer choices).
166. See Bronfenbrenner, supra note 4, at 301 (explaining that Shoup Mission preferred
VAT to retail sales tax because VAT, as tax on large businesses, would prevent reemergence of
Zaibatsu).
167. See Schenk, Value Added Tax, supra note 4, at 283-84 (arguing that implementation of
VAT will cause increase in prices).
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production and distribution, the price of the product or service in-
creases. 168 Therefore, tax scholars argue, the consumer ultimately
bears the tax burden vis a vis higher product prices. 169
1. An introduction to the regressivity debate
The most controversial effect of the CT on consumers is its poten-
tial regressivity. VATs are generally considered regressive levies be-
cause low-income groups, who spend a greater proportion of their
income on consumer goods than high-income groups, bear the
same amount of tax on their consumer purchases as do more afflu-
ent members of society.170 Legislators can counteract regressivity
with multiple tax rates, zero-ratings, and exemptions.' 7 ' Their use,
however, may add administrative and compliance costs that would
outweigh any derived benefit. 172
2. The CT and consumer prices: the neutrality issue
Japanese consumer prices have increased gradually since the in-
troduction of the CT in April 1989.17 Economists attribute part of
this increase to the implementation of the tax, but it is unknown
whether or not these increases will continue in the future. 174 Some
analysts perceive the inflationary effect of a VAT as a short-term
phenomenon and claim that prices level off after businesses "build"
168. Cf. Schuyler, supra note 11, at 574 (contending notion that tax shifts forward to con-
sumers is inaccurate because it shifts backward to producers and suppliers). Taxing authori-
ties in Japan apparently resolved this dispute by taxing consumers rather than businesses.
The latter is evidenced by the chosen name for the tax: consumption tax (i.e., tax on consum-
ers), not value-added tax (i.e., tax on value-added by producers and suppliers).
169. See Gravelle, supra note 140, at 1118 (arguing that one major problem with VAT is
probability that it would produce inflation); see also Schuyler, supra note 11, at 573 (explaining
that inflation, as "monetary phenomenon," would only occur if government accelerated
growth of money supply at same time that it introduced VAT); cf. Aaron, supra note 5, at 1113
(arguing that inflationary effect of VAT could be lessened by modifying Consumer Price Index
formula to remove impact of VAT from its calculation).
170. Zodrow, supra note 90, at 1395. But see Brannon, Is the Regressivity of the Value-Added
Tax an Important Issue?, 9 TAx NoTEs 879, 881 (1979) (reasoning that regressive nature of VAT
should be irrelevant because government has options to alleviate regressivity). However, it is
important to note that a progressive tax structure may defeat efficiency.
171. SeeJapanese CT §§ 5-6, 8 (listing exemptions and zero-ratings under CT legislation).
172. Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 122. See generally infra notes 184-90 and accom-
panying text (comparing single rate system to multiple rate system); infra notes 191-239 and
accompanying text (examining zero-ratings and exemptions).
173. See Steams, Tokyo Price Rise Shows Japan Inflation Gaining, The Reuters Bus. Rep., Apr.
28, 1989 (disclosing 2.6% increase in consumer prices from. mid-April 1988 to mid-April
1989).
174. Id. Japanese economists attributed part of this price increase to the CT, explaining
that prices did not rise by the amount of the full three percent CT rate because of the simulta-
neous repeal ofJapan's high indirect commodity taxes. Id.; see supra note 39 and accompany-
ing text (discussing commodity taxes).
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the VAT into the pricing structure of goods and services. 175
In contrast, other analysts fear that businesses will take advantage
of this allegedly one-time price increase to justify discretionary price
increases. 176 Nevertheless, the Japanese government is trying to
minimize the likelihood of impending inflation by relaxing Japan's
antitrust regulations to accommodate a controlled level of price
increases. 177
A related issue is the alleged effect of the VAT on product (or
service) choices made by consumers. Economists classify a tax as
"neutral" with respect to consumer choices 178 if it leaves those
choices unaffected by its imposition. 79 Tax analysts agree that the
VAT would be neutral if it taxed all goods and services equally.' 80
In such a system, the government would levy the tax on the value-
added to all goods and services so that consumers would not have to
choose products based on a determination of which impose VAT
and which do not.' 8 ' Multiple rates, exemptions, and zero-ratings
may force consumers to be tax conscious in their product choices.18 2
In this regard, the Japanese CT appears to be relatively neutral, be-
175. See DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, supra note 4, at 20-21. Assuming a VAT rate of 10%
in the United States, consumer prices would rise approximately 88% in a one-time increase.
Id.
176. See Steams, supra note 173 (reporting fears of Bank of Japan and other Japanese
monetary authorities that businesses will use CT as "smokescreen" on which to blame discre-
tionary price increases).
177. ARTHUR YOUNG, supra note 100, at 1 (stating that certain provisions ofJapan's anti-
trust laws have been relaxed to permit industry-wide price increases).
178. An additional aspect of VAT neutrality is its effect on the decision whether to con-
sume now or to invest. See Brannon, The Fairness of the Savings 'Loophole' in a Consumption Tax
Depends on Having a Tax at Death, 38 TAx NOTES 1253, 1254 (1988) (arguing that VAT favors
investment over consumption). But see DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, supra note 4, at 19 (viewing
VAT as savings-neutral). Consumer spending in Japan dropped 1.9% from August 1988 to
August 1989. Japan Consumer Spending Fell, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1989, at All, col. 2. It is
unknown what effect the CT had on this drop although the Statistics Bureau of the Prime
Minister's office attributed it to the typhoons during the month which discouraged shoppers.
Id.
One analyst contends that, because VATs favor savings (i.e., investment income), the most
equitable method of imposing the tax would be to simultaneously impose a 15-30% acces-
sions tax on the recipient of inheritances. Brannon, supra note 178, at 1254-55. But see Bran-
non, supra note 5, at 307 (explaining that accessions tax is unlikely due to general disfavor of
such taxes).
179. McLure, supra note 32, at 84; cf. A. OKUN, supra note 29, at 99 (explaining that neutral
tax system is "fantasy" because public opinion dictates tax expenditure decisions, not
market).
180. See McLure, supra note 5, at 972 (criticizing accepted view).
181. See A. TArr, supra note 1, at 42 (arguing that multiple VAT rates distort consumer and
producer choices).
182. In Morocco, for example, where basic food is exempt from VAT but processed food
is not, assume that tax authorities classify natural peanut butter as a basic food and processed
peanut butter as processed food. If prices of goods and services subject to VAT increase
subsequent to its initial imposition, the consumer will choose the presumably lower-priced,
tax-exempt product. See A. TArr, supra note 1, at 52 (summarizing exemptions and zero-rat-
ings for VATs of world).
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cause it uses only one tax rate and employs exemptions and zero-
ratings sparingly. 183
3. The superiority of the single rate CT system
The theories underlying multiple VAT rates bespeak the eternal
tax conflict between efficiency and equity.18 4 The policy choice
made by legislators in multiple tax rate jurisdictions reflects a belief
that some amount of administrative inconvenience, or inefficiency,
is necessary to ensure that the VAT remains a progressive, or equita-
ble, levy. 185 Although the two categories of multiple VAT ratings-
low rating of necessities and high rating of luxury goods-may be
popular among the VAT statutes of Europe,' 8 6 tax scholars gener-
ally abhor these systems as imposing too great an administrative
burden to justify their equitable result. 187
The Japanese CT rate structure promotes efficiency and equity to
a great extent. On one hand, single rate VATs are more efficient
than multiple rate VATs.' 8 On the other hand, the single rate VAT
structure of the Japanese CT is relatively equitable because the pres-
ent rate is so low that it may not unduly burden any individual con-
sumer.189 To the extent that the CT remains regressive, though, the
Japanese government implemented several zero-ratings and exemp-
tions to inject progressivity into the law.' 90
4. Enterprises or activities excluded from CT liability
The process of deciding which goods and services should receive
183. Japanese CT §§ 4-6.
184. See supra note 29 (tracing origins of efficiency/equity debate).
185. McLure, supra note 5, at 974.
186. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (pointing out that only two of European
Community's 12 members have single rate VAT structures).
187. A. TArT, supra note 1, at 42. As the number of rates increases, the risk of error, by
either the taxpayer or the taxing authorities, increases as well. Id.; accord McLure, supra note 5,
at 974 (explaining that risk of error increases as number of rates increases). In particular, low
rating too many items may translate into higher income or other tax rates. A. TAIT, supra note
1, at 42-43. This must have been an especially important consideration to Japanese legisla-
tors because the government plans to use a portion of the CT revenues to finance reductions
in marginal tax brackets in the individual and corporate income taxes. Bossons, International
Tax Competition: The Foreign Government Response in Canada and Other Countries, 41 NAT'L TAxJ.
347, 351 (1988); see supra note 12 and accompanying text (providing overview of other major
Japanese tax reforms).
188. A. TAIT, supra note 1, at 42.
189. See Japanese CT § 4 (setting CT rate at three percent). In this light, the current
social and political struggles in Japan over the CT are surprising. A 3% VAT levy, in and of
itself, is not overly burdensome. More often, however, VAT rates skyrocket over time. A.
TArr, supra note 1, at 40-41, 227. In the United Kingdom, for example, the original 1973 VAT
rate was 10%. The current rate is 15%. Id. at 41. As ofJuly 1, 1989, only Chile, Costa Rica,
and Peru reduced their VAT rates after introducing the tax. A. TAIr, supra note 1, at 40-41.
190. Discussion infra notes 204-39 and accompanying text.
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preferential treatment under any tax law appears to be a simple task:
the government should not tax activities it wants to encourage indi-
rectly or does not want to discourage indirectly. 19 1 In practice, how-
ever, for every group that receives a perceived benefit under the tax
law, other groups analogize their function to that of the "chosen"
group and claim a right to preferential tax treatment as well.
192
Under a VAT system, such claims pose three related problems.
First, some governments, the United States among them, are sus-
ceptible to pressures from lobbying groups.' 93 For instance, the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 contains several sections designed solely to
accommodate one specific party or transaction.' 94 Accordingly,
what may begin as a broad-based tax sometimes becomes so riddled
with exceptions from tax liability that the final law thwarts its own
revenue-raising efforts. 195
Second, a tax law containing many exceptions is more difficult to
administer than a pure broad-based tax.196 Complex legislation
may encourage taxpayers to evade taxes, which would require keen
and costly examinations of tax returns by taxing authorities. 197 In
addition, a tax law with many exemptions is expensive to administer,
because taxing authorities must educate themselves and the public
about the tax, enforce detailed documentation requirements, and
oversee other procedures associated with the administration of the
tax. 198 Third, as administrative burdens rise, the costs of complying
191. A. TArr, supra note 1, at 52.
192. See 136 CONG. REC. 514, 419, S14,421 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990) (Statement of Sen.
Hollings) (describing VAT as tax that "discourag[es] consumer binges and ... encourag[es]
savings").
193. Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 113; accord Turnier, supra note 3, at 462 (explain-
ing that United States political process is particularly susceptible to outside pressures such as
lobbyists).
194. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, section 210, 100 Stat. 2146-47
(1986) (providing transitional relief to "property which is an integral part of any qualified
urban renovation project"). Congress included this provision in the TRA due to lobbying
pressures from real estate developers. See This Week's Tax News, 31 TAX NoTEs 1053, 1054
(1986) (discussing special interest provisions added to Internal Revenue Code by TRA).
195. Turnier, supra note 136, at 1264.
196. Gravelle, supra note 140, at 1122 (noting efficiency benefits of VAT may be offset by
high administrative costs).
197. See DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, supra note 4, at 111 (estimating that United States
VAT would require 20,000 additional IRS employees and $700 million in added administra-
tive costs annually). These estimates do not consider costs incurred by other federal agencies,
such as those of United States Customs agents required to oversee the taxation of imports. Id.
at 122.
198. See id. at 111-22 (categorizing administrative costs). These categories include costs
incurred to oversee: (1) general information; (2) recordkeeping; (3) filing of returns; (4) pay-
ment of taxes; (5) imports subject to tax; (6) general enforcement; (7) public education; and
(8) manual and data processing of returns. Id.
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with the tax also rise.1 99
TheJapanese CT law uses zero-ratings and exemptions to achieve
its equitable objectives. 200 The law exempts eleven named items, 20 1
zero-rates exports, 20 2 and either wholly or partially exempts small
and medium-sized businesses from paying the tax. 20 3
a. Zero-ratings: the best way to combat regressivity?
The Japanese CT does not zero-rate or exempt many of the tradi-
tionally preferred goods and services in a VAT system;20 4 as such, it
places a priority value on efficiency over equity. The CT exemp-
tions are designed to promote political or governmental objectives,
such as the purchase of national-government bonds,2115 the sale of
nationally regulated gambling and lottery tickets, 206 and the provi-
sion of medical services provided under national insurance laws, 20 7
rather than the promotion of socially desirable goals.208
Japanese tax legislators created a generally regressive tax that
may unduly burden low-income groups. 20 9 The government com-
pensated for this potential regressivity by taxing consumption at an
extremely low rate to create what should be, in theory, a relatively
unobjectionable tax.210 The government might have implemented
other provisions, however, to combat the regressivity of the CT in
lieu of its reliance on low tax rates and few exclusions.
One alternative could have been an expansion of the list of zero-
rated or exempt items under the law. Most EEC nations zero-rate
199. See Turnier supra note 139, at 1263 (explaining that efficient tax system minimizes,
inter alia, number of difficult decisions that taxpayers need to make).
200. See supra notes 119-34 and accompanying text (discussing exempt transactions and
zero-rated items underJapanese CT law).
201. Japanese CT § 6; see also supra note 130 (listing exempt items).
202. Japanese CT § 5.
203. Id. § 8.
204. Most notably, the CT does not provide preferential treatment for food purchases.
Compare id. §§ 5-6 (listing CT exclusions) with J. PECHMAN, supra note 16, at 297, 334 (essay
authored by N. Morris) (listing United Kingdom VAT exclusions). Zero-rated items in the
United Kingdom include food, water, books, fuel, power, construction, exports, transporta-
tion, children's clothing, and protective clothing. Id. Exempt items in the United Kingdom
include land, insurance, postal service, betting, finance, education, health services, burial, and
cremation. Id.
205. Japanese CT § 6(2).
206. Id. § 6(5).
207. Id. § 6(9).
208. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (describing CT exemptions as motivated
politically, not socially).
209. See Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 122 (arguing broad-based VAT is regressive
because proportion of income spent on consumption declines as income rises). Low-income
households spend all of their income on necessities while higher-income households can save.
Id.; see supra notes 170-72 (describing regressivity in general).
210. See Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 113 (reasoning that Japanese taxpayers are
unlikely to evade tax when compliance costs are low).
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food and other necessities 211 to reduce the indirect tax burden on
low-income consumers.2 12 The public relations benefit of such a
system in Japan would outweigh any administrative complications
that the provision would add to the tax system. Japan's experiences
indicate that the most important aspect of a new tax may be its pub-
lic perception. 213 Japanese consumers might have viewed a zero-
rating for groceries, for example, as highly beneficial despite the
possibility of a one to two percent higher CT rate to compensate for
foregone tax revenues. 21 4
Some tax scholars believe, however, that zero-ratings do not focus
on the problem presented by regressive tax structures: how to pro-
vide a benefit directly to low-income groups. 2 15 Therefore, a sec-
ond alternative that may deal more effectively with this problem is
the establishment of a credit system, similar to the earned income
credit in the United States Internal Revenue Code, for certain ne-
cessities.2 16 This system would specifically target low-income earn-
ers as groups warranting preferential treatment under the law. The
available credit would decrease as income rises and eventually
phase-out when income peaks at a certain level. 21 7 This solution,
however, may involve substantial administrative costs. 218
b. Zero-rating of exports and related issues: does the CT favor
Japanese goods and services over foreign products?
One of the most often debated VAT policy issues concerns the
VAT's effect on the competitiveness of foreign products in interna-
tional trade. 21 9 Many analysts believe that the introduction of a des-
211. Necessities are those products and services purchased in larger quantities by low-
income groups than by high-income groups. See TRAC Act § 4012(a) (zero-rating food, hous-
ing, and medical care).
212. See supra note 204 (comparing extensive list of zero-rated items in United Kingdom
with CT law).
213. See Ohmae, supra note 16, at A19, col. 3 (reporting Japanese frustration with CT
because people did not know what to expect when government enacted law).
214. See Brannon, supra note 5, at 307 (reasoning that middle class might perceive VAT
exclusion of food purchases as beneficial despite possibility that VAT rates would be percent-
age point higher to accommodate exclusion); see also supra note 19 (notingJapanese govern-
ment is currently considering exemption for food and other necessities).
215. See Zodrow, supra note 90, at 1396 (explaining that some analysts oppose zero-rat-
ings for necessities because they benefit all groups, not just low-income earners).
216. McLure, supra note 8, at 1524; see I.R.C. § 32 (1986) (setting forth earned income
credit).
217. The earned income credit under the Internal Revenue Code phases out completely
when earned income exceeds $11,000. I.R.C. § 32 (1986); see S. SURREY, supra note 11, at 573
(describing earned income credit in detail).
218. See Zodrow, supra note 90, at 1396 (stating tax credit system targets lower income
households but requires high administrative costs to avoid fraud and to refund payments).
219. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, supra note 4, at 21-23 (contending that VAT re-
bates put all products on "equal footing" in international markets); Brannon, Does VATProvide
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tination principle VAT 220 actually increases the competitiveness of
the taxingjurisdiction's products in foreign markets. 221 In contrast,
some experts maintain that this perceived benefit does nothing
more than provide relief from inflation, 222 currency adjustments, 22 3
and retaliatory actions by other countries.224
This competitiveness issue raises an interesting issue that is espe-
cially relevant to Japan: should notions of equity in a tax structure
apply equally to both foreign and domestic consumers? If so, and if
a Balance of Trade Advantage?, 30 TAx NO'Es 1387, 1389 (1986) (arguing that VATs are merely
border tax adjustments); Garber, The Role of Consumption Taxes in Tax Reform Around the World,
41 NAT'L TAxJ. 357, 364 (1988) (admitting uncertainty surrounding alleged competitiveness
of products exported from VAT jurisdiction to foreign markets); Zodrow, supra note 90, at
1399 n.2 (suggesting that VATs may provide trade advantage to extent they replace other
noncreditable taxes).
220. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (defining and explaining destination
principle).
221. Zodrow, supra note 90, at 1399. Some authorities argue that the introduction of a
VAT enhances trade advantage by allowing exporters to charge lower prices for their products
than they would charge in a corporate income tax system at the same per product profit. This
occurs because a taxpayer in a destination principle VAT jurisdiction is not liable for VAT on
its export sales and may claim input tax credits for any VAT paid on corresponding purchases.
Japanese CT § 5; see DEPARTMENT OF TREAsuRY, supra note 4, at 21-22 (explaining that Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) allows countries to provide rebates for indirect
taxes, such as VATs, but not for direct taxes). As such, the CT may have dumping implica-
tions. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450-62 (1978) (discussing
dumping implications in allowing rebate ofJapanese commodity tax to companies that export
products); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text (identifying Japanese commodity tax
as predecessor to CT and describing tax). The Supreme Court explained that it would not be
excessive to allow a five dollar commodity tax rebate upon exportation of a product if the
taxing authorities imposed a five dollar tax "at the factory." Zenith Radio Corp., 437 U.S. at
450-53. However, an eight dollar rebate upon exportation would be excessive if the taxing
authorities only imposed a five dollar tax "at the factory." Id. One defines dumping as the
process by which exporters "sell goods abroad at less than the fair market price at home."
BLACK's LAW DIcriONARY 451 (5th ed. 1979); see Fisher, The Antidumping Law of the United States:
A Legal and Economic Analysis, 5 LAw & POLY. ITr'L Bus. 85, 86-93 (1973) (discussing economics
of dumping).
222. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, supra note 4, at 21 (stating that VAT initiation may only
result in one time price level increase and reasoning that price level impact may be offset
through reduction of other taxes). Experts who do not believe VATs increase international
competitiveness perceive the rebate feature of a destination principle VAT as merely a border
tax adjustment designed to put products sold internationally on "equal footing." Id. at 22.
The effect of the destination principle is to counteract the inflated prices that often accom-
pany the enactment of a VAT vis a vis the rebate feature. Id.
223. See Brannon, supra note 219, at 1389 (arguing that, even if there was short-term in-
crease in competitiveness of exports, increased purchases would raise value of exporting
country's currency that would offset benefits of temporary attractiveness of exports); cf.
Garber, supra note 219, at 364 (indicating alleged currency adjustments do not consistently
occur after VAT is introduced); Schenk, Value Added Tax, supra note 4, at 278 (noting that
countries belonging to International Monetary Fund, of which Japan is member, may not lib-
erally manipulate currency rates). Despite forecasts by some tax analysts that the temporary
competitiveness of exported goods may result in currency value increases, the Japanese yen
has actually weakened during the first five months since April 1, 1989, which may actually
strengthen Japanese exports. Ono,Japan's Trade Surplus Shrinks But Imbalance With U.S. Widens,
Wall St.J., Oct. 13, 1989, at All, col. 4.
224. Brannon, supra note 219, at 1389 (stating political pressures placed on foreign gov-
ernment representative might trigger potential retaliatory trade actions).
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one accepts the premise that a VAT increases the competitiveness of
exported goods, then the United States may perceive the CT as an-
other means by which Japan can increase the competitiveness of its
goods at the expense of United States domestic goods.225 This is
relevant to the extent that the CT payment provisions actually favor
domestic goods over imported goods. Domestic businesses have
the potential to enjoy greater flexibility in handling cash flow than
import businesses. Importers must pay taxes prior to removing
their goods from bonded areas,226 while domestic businesses collect
taxes from purchasers, retaining those funds on the government's
behalf until the applicable CT return filing period. 227 This allows
domestic business enterprises to "play the float" with their tax pay-
ments, an option unavailable to importers.228
c. Preferential treatment for small and medium-sized businesses
Small and medium-sized business enterprises must consider
whether or not their position should be one of CT advocacy or CT
opposition. 229 On one hand, small and medium-sized businesses
may bear unduly high costs of compliance with the requirements of
the law.23 0 On the other hand, these business enterprises may de-
sire to register for the tax to be eligible for net VAT refunds, or,
perhaps more importantly, to avoid the appearance, if not the reality
225. See Trade Imbalances-TheJapanese View, Wall St.J., Sept. 18, 1989, at C 16, col. 1 (spe-
cial advertising section: Japan business survey) (reporting that Japan has $50 billion trade
surplus with United States although its world-wide trade surplus appears to be dwindling). It
is generally accepted that the destination principle is superior to the origin principle. See
generally Cnossen, supra note 114 (advocating use of destination principle by EEC and United
States). Recent developments in the EEC indicate continued reliance on the destination prin-
ciple over the origin principle for the foreseeable future. See supra note 114 and accompany-
ing text (noting that EEC rejected suggestion to convert all VATs to origin principle
subsequent to 1992 European unification).
226. Japanese CT § 9(2). Importers usually do not have any input tax credits available
because they purchase supplies for their products outside the tax jurisdiction and thus do not
incur any CT on their purchases.
227. Id. § 9(1). The government requires taxpayers to file CT returns within two months
of the last day of either the calendar year (for personal enterprises) or the fiscal year (for
corporations). Id. §§ 9(1)(a) & (c). In addition, enterprises that paid CTs exceeding 300,000
yen in the previous tax period must file estimated payments within two months of the final day
of the first half of the tax year. Id. § 9(1)(b). Businesses may also elect to file CT returns on a
quarterly basis. Id. § 9(1)(a). Most businesses expecting a net CT refund will file on this
basis to avoid operating at a negative float, i.e., allowing the government to hold their money
for the length of the full reporting period. Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 116 (detailing
extra burdens, derived from VAT compliance, under VATs creating negative cash float).
228. See Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 116 (indicating that taxpayer enjoying posi-
tive float earns interest that offsets burden of VAT compliance).
229. Turnier, supra note 3, at 459 (indicating small businesses must balance VAT compli-
ance burdens with perceived benefits of VAT compliance).
230. See id. (positing compliance with VAT is more difficult for smaller businesses that do
not have existing internal labor structure and economies of scale that can ease VAT
compliance).
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of commercial insignificance. 23 ' The Japanese CT law responds ef-
fectively to these competing considerations of small and medium-
sized businesses by providing several levels of small business ex-
emptions and by establishing a simplified tax calculation for qualify-
ing entities.23 2
First, the law provides two levels of exemptions: (1) complete ex-
emption for small-sized businesses 233 and (2) partial exemption for
medium-sized businesses. 23 4 In providing these exemptions, the
CT legislators were sympathetic to medium-sized businesses from
which the government should collect some, but not the total, tax. 235
Second, the simplified system available to small and medium-
sized businesses allows businesses with taxable sales under 500 mil-
lion yen ($3.8 million) to compute the input tax credit under a sys-
tem even simpler than the account-based method. 236 This may
encourage businesses eligible for the complete or partial exemp-
tions to either register for the CT or to comply more readily with its
requirements. 237
Both the complete and partial small business exemptions and the
simplified input tax credit calculation for small and medium-sized
businesses complicate tax administration.238 These arrangements,
however, may actually improve tax collection to the extent that
small and medium-sized businesses comply with the law more read-
ily than they might absent preferential treatment.23 9
231. Id. In addition, managers of small and medium-sized business enterprises may use
the CT to centralize control of their companies. See Chiu & Siegel, supra note 4, at 4 (noting
that VAT can be powerful internal control tool).
232. Japanese CT § 8(2) (listing exemptions and providing calculation).
233. Id. § 8(1); see supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text (discussing complete exemp-
tion from CT for small-sized businesses).
234. Japanese CT § 8(2); see supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (discussing partial
exemption from CT for small and medium-sized businesses).
235. See Turnier, supra note 3, at 459 (positing reasons that small or medium-sized business
enterprise would register for CT).
236. See supra note 107 (describing simplified tax calculation for small and medium-sized
business enterprises); see also supra notes 149-64 and accompanying text (analyzing account-
based method in detail).
237. Businesses eligible for the complete exemption under section 8(l) may register for
the tax, electing to use the simplified system to ease compliance burdens while maintaining
the appearance of commercial viability. Japanese CT § 8(l). Businesses eligible for the par-
tial exemption under section 8(2) may also use the simplified system. Id. §§ 8(2)-(3). This, in
turn, may encourage greater taxpayer compliance as the simplified system will ease documen-
tation requirements and the partial exemption will lighten the tax obligation of the partially
exempt organization. See A. TAIT, supra note 1, at 113 (noting record-keeping burdens of
small enterprises in complying with VAT); see also Turnier, supra note 3, at 459 (comparing
high compliance costs to notions of commercial viability in determining whether small busi-
nesses should register for CT).
238. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text (describing administrative burdens
caused by excessive exceptions to tax).
239. Turnier, supra note 3, at 459 (suggesting small businesses may decide benefits of
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C. A Brief Comparison of the CT with Recent Proposed VAT Legislation
in the United States
The Japanese CT law provides a more realistic framework of
value-added taxation than either of two recently proposed United
States VAT statutes: the Value Added Tax Act (Act)2 4 0 and the Tax
Reform and Competitiveness Act (TRAC).241 Although both pro-
posals are broad-based, consumption-style,242 destination-princi-
ple,248 invoice-method VATs, 244 each presents a different approach
to the tradeoff between efficiency and equity. The final decision as
to which of the two statutes is viable in the United States depends
on where one draws the line between the efficient administration of
the tax system and the equitable enforcement of those tax laws. 245
1. The Value Added Tax Act
The American Bar Association (ABA) drafted the Value Added
Tax Act as a model statute that it would support if the United States
ever enacted a VAT. 246 The Act probably would not be adopted in
its present form due to legislative pressures it has yet to undergo. 247
It is an important proposal, however, in considering the ongoing
struggle between efficiency, equity, and simplicity because it repre-
sents the extreme view that efficiency is of paramount importance-
even at the sake of accompanying regressivity. 248
The tax base of the VAT proposed in the Act is extremely
broad.249 Although the Japanese CT also functions as a broad-
based levy, that law compensates for its breadth of coverage by im-
VAT participation outweigh VAT compliance costs, where VAT provides for preferential treat-
ment for small businesses).
240. See supra note 4.
241. S. 2084, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S898 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1990) (state-
ment of Sen. Hollings).
242. See supra note 4 (defining consumption-style VAT).
243. See supra note 114 (comparing destination principle with origin principle).
244. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (discussing invoice method VAT used
in EEC).
245. See generally Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 122-23 (comparing Japanese CT to
New Zealand VAT and VAT proposals in United States and Canada on efficiency and equity
grounds).
246. See ABA House of Delegates, Rep. 301 (1986) (Resolution on Value Added Tax)
quoted in A. SCHEMN, COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 277 (noting ABA approval of Value Added
Tax Act).
247. See Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 113 (explaining that Value Added Tax Act
may be as broad-based as it is because it has not yet gone through legislative process); see also
supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text (noting general susceptibility of legislatures to
outside pressures).
248. See A. SCHENK, COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 70-72 (inferring certain expenditures
represent too great percentage of total United States consumer expenditures for government
to consider granting them preferential treatment under Act).
249. Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 114.
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posing a low three percent tax rate. 250 The authors of the Value
Added Tax Act did not include a suggested rate in their proposal.
Such a rate would have been an important factor in considering the
viability of the Act.2 5 1
The Value Added Tax Act, like the CT law, provides few zero-
ratings and exemptions. 252 The Act zero-rates exports, 253 thereby
establishing the tax as a destination principle VAT.254 In addition,
the drafters provided exemptions for few activities, such as transfers
of property in bankruptcy and sales of property or services outside
the United States that do not constitute taxable export
transactions. 255
The drafters of the Act maintain that measures targeted toward
low-income groups would offset the regressive effects of the tax bet-
ter than extensive zero-ratings and exemptions. 256 For instance,
they suggested that the government increase food stamps, employ
income tax credits, and reduce other tax rates to specifically accom-
modate low-income groups in lieu of zero-rating food.257 The draft-
ers argued that food purchases are too great a percentage of total
personal consumption to allow all groups to escape taxation on
these purchases. 258
Despite some similarities, the Value Added Tax Act differs sub-
stantially from the CT law: the Act uses the invoice method, does
not provide preferential treatment for small businesses, and taxes
250. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text (discussing combination of broad base
and low rate in Japanese CT).
251. See Value Added Tax Act § 4001(b) (failing to set tax rate).
252. See supra notes 119-34 and accompanying text (discussing zero-ratings and exemp-
tions in CT law).
253. Value Added Tax Act § 4012. The Act would zero-rate sales of exported goods and
services. A. SCHENK, COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 67.
254. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing destination principle).
255. Value Added Tax Act § 4004. The Act exempts the following transactions from VAT
liability:
(1) transfers by a debtor to a creditor of either possession or a security interest in property
or services, such as posting of collateral (but an actual transfer of ownership is a taxable sale
under Value Added Tax Act § 4039),
(2) transfers to a fiduciary representing the interests of a legally disabled owner in his or
her fiduciary capacity,
(3) transfers of property in bankruptcy,
(4) property imported duty-free under United States tariff laws,
(5) sales of property or services outside of the United States that do not constitute export
transactions,
(6) any other transaction as determined by the Secretary provided granting such an ex-
emption does not reduce net tax revenue.
Id § 4004.
256. A. SCHENK, COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 71-72.
257. Id. at 71.
258. Id. at 70 (noting that food purchases comprised 16% of total 1935 personal con-
sumption). Medical care is also not zero-rated under the Act for similar reasons. See id. at 72
(noting expenses of medical care comprised 12.5% of total 1985 personal consumption).
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large non-business transactions. Unlike the CT law, which calcu-
lates the input tax credit based on "deemed" qualifying
purchases, 259 the Act disallows any input tax credit unsubstantiated
by a tax invoice 26 0 and imposes penalties on taxpayers who fail to
provide a tax invoice when it is required.261
The Act taxes small and medium-sized businesses like all other
business entities.262 In contrast, the CT law provides several levels
of exemptions, as well as simplified tax calculations, for small and
medium-sized businesses.2 63 The commentary to the Act indicates
that the drafters would prefer simplified accounting procedures,
such as alternative calculations and easier record-keeping require-
ments, to a small business exemption. 264 Nevertheless, the com-
mentary to the Act includes a de minimis exemption for small
businesses that the ABA would recommend in the event Congress
absolutely required inclusion of a small business exemption.2 65
The most unusual provision of the Value Added Tax Act is its
imposition of tax liability on nonbusiness sales exceeding an undis-
closed threshold amount.2 66 The CT law, and most other VAT leg-
islation, imposes tax only on business transactions.2 67 The Value
Added Tax Act sacrifices equity in favor of efficient tax collection by
imposing a tax on an extremely broad business and non-business
tax base.
2. The Tax Reform and Competitiveness Act
The Tax Reform and Competitiveness Act (TRAC Act), proposed
by the United States Senate, presents the opposite approach to the
259. See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text (discussing calculation of CT).
260. Value Added Tax Act § 4022(c). The Act requires the tax invoice to contain the
seller's name and identification number, the purchaser's name, the amount of tax paid on the
transaction, and other specified information. Id. § 4022(b).
261. Id. § 6652(m). The Act does not specify dollar amounts of penalties. Id.
262. See A. SCHENK, COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 86-92 (recommending against complete
exemption for small and medium-sized businesses).
263. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text (describing preferential treatment for
small businesses under CT law).
264. See A. SCHENK, COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 86-87 (determining that such measures
would neither reduce tax revenues nor lessen VAT neutrality).
265. See id. at 90-91 (suggesting that Congress set low de minimis level of sales to reduce
possible distortion caused by removal of smaller producers and distributors from chain).
266. Value Added Tax Act § 4003(a)(3)(A); see Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 114
(noting taxability of non-business transactions in support of assertion that Act imposes "ex-
ceptionally broad-based tax"). The commentary to the Act suggested $50,000 as a threshold
amount. See A. SCHENK, COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 25 (recommending $50,000 as ade-
quate threshold so as to reduce number of VAT returns filed).
267. See Schenk, Policy Issues, supra note 4, at 114-16 (naming Value Added Tax Act as only
VAT to tax non-business transactions as compared with Japanese CT, New Zealand VAT, and
proposed Canadian VAT); see also supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text (describing types
of transactions subject to CT).
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Value Added Tax Act and the CT law by providing many zero-rat-
ings and exemptions to create an overly equitable, highly inefficient
tax. The suggested tax rate for this VAT is surprisingly low at five
percent. 268 Taxpayers would calculate this tax under the invoice
method. 269
Like the CT law, the TRAC Act zero-rates exports; 270 however,
unlike the CT law, the TRAC Act zero-rates several other items, in-
cluding food, housing, and medical care. 271 The TRAC Act also
grants a de minimis exemption for small businesses. 272 Although the
consequent tax contemplated in the TRAC Act is progressive, it is
generally accepted that abundant zero-ratings breed high adminis-
trative CoStS. 273
Finally, the VAT proposed in the TRAC Act is one of six measures
designed to simultaneously stimulate the economy and reduce the
budget deficit. According to Senator Hollings, the proposed VAT
would increase government revenues by $53 billion.274 In light of
268. See S. 2084, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S51665 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1990)
(Statement of Sen. Hollings) (suggesting five percent as proper VAT rate). Senator Hollings
maintains that a five percent VAT could net $70 billion in added annual revenues. Id. A VAT
without zero-ratings or exemptions would net almost $125 billion in added annual revenues.
GAO Report Examines Revenue Benefits, Regressivity, Compliance Costs of VAT, Daily Rep. for Execu-
tives, at G3 (Sept. 29, 1989).
269. See TRAC Act § 4022 (listing requirements of tax invoices). The TRAC Act requires
the same information to be included in tax invoices as is required by the Value Added Tax
Act. See supra note 261 (listing requirements of tax invoices under Value Added Tax Act).
270. TRAC Act § 4013(3).
271. The TRAC zero-rates the following items:
(1) food,
(2) sale or lease of principal residence,
(3) medical care,
(4) sales by farmers and fishers,
(5) performance of mass transit services,
(6) exports,
(7) interest,
(8) sales to governmental entities,
(9) educational activities of governmental entities,
(10) sales by governmental entities where separate charge is not made,
(11) transactions entered into by organizations exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
(1986).
TRAC Act §§ 4012-15.
272. Id. § 4023. This provision is similar to the small business exemption included in the
commentary to the Value Added Tax Act. See supra note 265 and accompanying text (noting
this provision of Value Added Tax Act).
273. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (discussing VAT administrative costs).
274. See S. 2084, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S898 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Hollings) (listing six components of TRAC Act). These components are:
(1) a five percent VAT,
(2) a reduction in the FICA tax rate from 6.2 to 5.1 percent,
(3) a preferential tax rate on capital gains,
(4) an IRA tax deduction,
(5) an investment tax credit, and
(6) a Federal revenue sharing program with the states.
Id. Other than the VAT, all of these measures would increase the budget deficit. See id. (de-
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the zero-ratings and exemptions contained in the TRAC Act, how-
ever, it appears unlikely that this highl' inefficient tax could substan-
tially reduce the budget deficit.275
3. The CT: efficiency/equity middle ground
The Japanese CT is a compromise between the highly efficient
and regressive structure of the Value Added Tax Act and the highly
equitable and progressive structure of the Tax Reform and Compet-
itiveness Act. The final answer as to whether the Japanese CT
presents a positive step in the evolution of value-added taxation
hinges on the balancing between the compliance benefits of an ac-
count-based, credit-subtractive VAT and the added administrative
burdens of such a tax.276 At minimum, the Japanese CT law
elaring that these measures would increase deficit by $53.1 billion). These proposals would
stimulate savings and investment and would be compensated for by the VAT. Id. In addition,
the VAT could be used in future years to reduce and eventually eliminate the Federal deficit.
Id.; see also supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing role that VAT could play in reduc-
ing budget deficit).
The previous congressional VAT proposal, the Deficit and Debt Reduction Act of 1989,
would have required that tax revenues be placed in a "Deficit Reduction Trust Fund" that the
United States government could use to reduce the deficit. See Savings Regulator Seeks $100
Billionfor Bailout in '91, N.Y. TimesJuly 31, 1990, at 1, col. 6 (projecting United States budget
deficit to reach $163 million). Senator Hollings, spoisor of both the 1989 Deficit Act and the
1990 TRAC Act, perceives a VAT as the best method to reduce the United States deficit be-
cause it would raise "one heck of a lot of money." 135 CONG. REC. S1665 (daily ed. Feb. 23,
1989) (statement of Sen. Hollings). The Deficit Act would have expressly prohibited the use
of collected revenues for any purpose other than deficit reduction. See Deficit and Debt Re-
duction Act of 1989 § 3114(a). The government may also pay costs associated with adminis-
tering the tax out of the trust fund. Id. § 3114(c)(2).
275. See Gravelle, supra note 140, at 1117 (stating administrative costs involved require
VAT system capable of generating $100 billion). Considering that the Deficit Act was only
estimated to raise $53 billion, a United States VAT would have to contain fewer zero-ratings
and exemptions to be successful. See GAO Report Examines Revenue, Benefits, Regressivity, Compli-
ance Costs of VAT, Daily Rep. for Executives, at G3 (Sept. 29, 1989) (indicating that VAT with-
out exemptions or zero-ratings would raise $125 billion).
276. The following chart compares the CT law with the Value Added Tax Act and the
TRAC Act:
VALUE
ADDED TAX REFORM AND
CT TAX ACT COMPETITIVENESS ACT
Style: consumption consumption consumption
Principle: destination destination destination
Method: Account-based Invoice Invoice
Credit- Credit- Credit-
Subtractive Subtractive Subtractive
Rates: single (three N/A single (five percent)
percent)
Zero-Rate: exports exports 11 categories 44
Exempt: supra note 130 supra note 255 N/A
The most efficient and least equitable statute is the Value Added Tax Act because it pro-
vides few exemptions and zero-ratings. See supra notes 136-45 and accompanying text (listing
characteristics of efficient and equitable tax system). The least efficient and most equitable
statute is the TRAC Act because it provides many extensive zero-ratings. Id.
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presents a more realistic view of the efficiency/equity/simplicity
debate.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Deriving a completely new tax system may be substantially easier
than modifying a pre-existing tax structure. 277 This Comment rec-
ommends that the United States devise a VAT. The proposal that
follows reflects the author's preferred balance of the competing
objectives of efficiency, equity, and simplicity. Unlike the United
States, Japan need only revise the CT law slightly by providing pref-
erential treatment for consumer food purchases to respond to grow-
ing consumer disapproval of the tax.
A. Recommendations for Japan
Despite pressures to abolish the CT, it should be upheld as a posi-
tive means to accomplish several important tax objectives. The CT
is only part of a larger scheme to provide substantial tax cuts. 278
The CT suffers because of the Japanese government's failure to pro-
mote accompanying cuts inJapan's already high income tax rates. 279
One suggested revision to the CT is to earmark all CT revenues
for either the care of elderly or some other specific purpose.280 The
government presently uses CT revenues to reduce Japan's budget
277. See 135 CONG. REC. S1665 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hollings)
(arguing failed effort in 1986 to modify tax system demonstrates need for VAT).
278. See supra notes 19-20 (summarizing other reforms).
279. Prior to the 1988 tax reforms, the individual income tax rates ranged from 10.5% to
60%o in 12 brackets, the individual inhabitants tax (prefectural tax) ranged from 5%o to 16%o in
seven brackets, and the corporate income tax rates were 42%o for ordinary corporations and
30%o for small and medium-sized corporations. After the 1988 tax reforms, the individual
income tax rates ranged from 10% to 50% in only five brackets, the individual inhabitants tax
ranged from 5% to 15%, and the corporate income tax rates were 40% for ordinary corpora-
tions in 1989 (37.5% in 1990) and 29% for small and medium-sized corporations in 1989
(28% in 1990). Main Points of Tax Reform §§ 1(1), 5(1). In comparison, the maximum
United States individual income tax rate is 28% and the maximum United States corporate
income tax rate is 34%o. I.R.C. §§ 1, 11(b)(1)(C) (1986).
280. See Japan Begins Discussing Revision, supra note 22 (indicating possibility of funneling
proceeds of CT to social welfare). The Japanese senior citizen population grew from five
percent of the total population in 1959 to almost 12%y in 1989, or 10.5 million people out of
Japan's total population of approximately 123 million. Japan to Face Unlikely Challenge Next
Century--The Elderly, The Reuters Bus. Rep., Sept. 15, 1989; telephone interview with Nori
Shikata, Information Section, Embassy of Japan, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 25, 1990). But see
Hiatt, U.S.,Japan Discuss Economies, Wash. Post, Sept. 6, 1989, at Cl, col. 2 (urging government
to "spend more on roads, parks, airports and sewers" because Japanese consumer has rela-
tively low standard of living). Many believe that the Japanese are presently financially incapa-
ble of caring for this growing sector of the population. See Shoven, The Japanese Tax Reform and
Effective Rate of Tax on Japanese Corporate Investment, TAx PouIcv AND THE ECONOMY 114 (L. Sum-
meis ed. 1989) (suggesting use of CT revenues to care for elderly).
1302
1991] THE JAPANESE CONSUMPTION TAX 1303
deficit,28 1 supplement the revenues of the prefectures28 2 and local
governments, 283 and fund the tax cuts provided by the other 1988
tax reforms. 28 4 It is questionable whether all CT revenues should
be earmarked for any one purpose, even Japan's growing elderly
population, although a portion of such revenues should be used to
care for this growing sector of theJapanese population.2 5 The gov-
ernment needs CT revenues for several purposes and should not
limit its potential benefit to only one group or project.
An exclusion for food purchases may be necessary for the contin-
ued vitality of the CT. Although efficiency goals motivated the CT
legislators,286 and a zero-rating for food would be inefficient, it is
nevertheless required to make the CT more palatable to the grow-
ing Japanese consumer movement.287
Alternatively, the government should consider implementing a
credit system 288 for consumer food purchases rather than a zero-
rating. Zero-ratings are administratively burdensome, and thus
should be avoided. Although a credit system also imposes adminis-
trative burdens, the taxing authorities could circumvent them by al-
lowing consumers to credit the CT incurred on their food purchases
281. See supra note 225; see Ono, supra note 223, at Al1l, col. 4 (reporting drop in global
trade surplus from $7.76 billion in September 1988 to $7.24 billion in September 1989).
282. See supra note 73 (outlining development of assistance of prefectures through tax
revenues).
283. Japanese CT § 13. The CT law also established the consumption transfer tax (CTT)
to transfer 20% of CT revenues to the prefectural and local governments. Id. § 13(1); see also
Main Points of Tax Reform § 6(1) (revealing that prefectural governments will receive six-
elevenths of CTT and municipal governments will receive five-elevenths of CTT). The local
governments also receive CT revenues through the Local Grants Tax. Id. § 6(2);J. PECHMAN,
supra note 16, at 426. Although the national government collects almost two-thirds of all
taxes in Japan, it transfers approximately 35% of collected taxes to the prefectures and local
governments. O'Keefe, supra note 2, at 401.
284. See supra notes 19-20 (discussing other reforms).
285. Ironically, the argument for earmarking CT revenues for the elderly underscores one
of the fundamental debates regarding the regressivity of VATs in general. See Aaron, supra
note 5, at 114 (presenting argument that VAT is double taxation of elderly); see also supra note
5, at 976 (expressing equity issues connected with VAT, regressivity, and elderly). But see
Schuyler, supra note 11, at 574 (implying that this contention relies on faulty assumption that
VAT shifts burden of taxation forward to consumers and arguing it actually shifts backward to
producers and suppliers). Opponents of value-added taxation base their argument on the
premise that the elderly finance their retirements, in part, through savings of past income.
Such income has already been taxed at pre-VAT income tax rates. Aaron, supra note 5, at 114.
By using VAT revenues to finance income tax rate reductions, taxing the consumption of the
elderly constitutes double taxation of their income: first, when the elderly taxpayer earned his
or her income, and second, when the elderly taxpayer spends the funds during his or her
retirement years for personal consumption. Id.
286. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text (discussing apparent legislative objec-
tive of promoting efficiency over progressivity).
287. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text (explaining that middle class might be
more receptive to VAT that zero-rated food).
288. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text (analogizing such system to earned
income credit in Internal Revenue Code).
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against their income tax liability on their income tax returns. This
alternative would be equitable to consumers and efficient to tax ad-
ministrators because it does not create the paperwork generated by
either a zero-rating or a separate tax form.
B. Recommendations for the United States
The United States should impose a VAT similar to the Japanese
CT with some attributes of both the Value Added Tax Act and the
TRAC Act. An American VAT could provide substantial revenues
that may be used to reduce the budget deficit, 28 9 lower other tax
rates,290 fund the social security system,29' or subsidize other social
programs.2 92
There is some question as to which VAT calculation method
would be superior for an American VAT. From an efficiency stand-
point, the invoice method VAT may be superior to the account-
based method because it would create an audit trail for taxing au-
thorities. However, the account-based feature would be superior
from a compliance standpoint.2 9
The United States may compromise by allowing small and me-
dium-sized businesses to use the account-based method294 and re-
quiring large taxpayers to use the invoice method. By allowing
smaller enterprises to substantiate their input tax credits with their
books of account, the tax administration would generate greater tax
revenues than they could by implementing any other preferential
treatment. In addition, it would alleviate potential feelings of com-
mercial insignificance by smaller taxpayers. The government may
also consider allowing large businesses to credit all or part of their
289. See Aaron, supra note 5, at 1111 (explaining that deficit reduction is primary reason
for adopting VAT, but suggesting that current deficit projections are understated and actually
much larger). But see Blustein, Doubt Growing About Chances for Reducing Budget Deficit, Wash.
Post, Sept. 24, 1989, at A18, col. I (criticizing efforts to reduce United States deficit as con-
centrating only on short-term). In solving deficit problems for fiscal 1990, the government
placed greater deficit burdens on fiscal 1991 and future fiscal years. Id.
290. See A. TArr, supra note 1, at 21 (suggesting reductions in corporate and individual
taxes through introduction of VAT).
291. Id. at 33.
292. The United States government can use VAT revenues for the defense budget. Id. at
32-33. Such revenues can also be used to fund social programs in, inter alia, child care, educa-
tion, the environment, and the fight against drugs. Id. at 31-33. One imaginative, if not ideal-
istic, tax scholar contends that a popular President could convince the American people to
accept a 10% VAT where the proceeds would be paid into a national defense trust fund. This
would serve two goals: first, the costs of national defense would be provided for; second, such
costs would be removed from the budget as the VAT would supply its sole funding. Galvin,
supra note 27, at 278-79.
293. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (defining compliance costs).
294. The government should also provide a complete exemption from the law for smaller
business enterprises. See Japanese CT § 8(1) (granting complete exemption for small-sized
businesses).
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costs in setting up the invoice method against their first year VAT
liability to appease their potential dissatisfaction with preferential
small business treatment. Although use of the account-based
method sacrifices an audit trail, this loss may not prove burdensome
because the government collects a smaller percentage of tax reve-
nue from this group. 295 Therefore, an account-based system for
small and medium-sized businesses would function like a de minimis
rule. The account-based system also simplifies enforcement of the
tax as it virtually eliminates the need to search for certain types of
tax nonpayment.
CONCLUSION
The most important lesson to be learned from Japan is that an
intense public relations campaign must precede the successful intro-
duction of a VAT into a taxing jurisdiction.296 Japanese consumers
were not apprised of the details of the CT and, therefore, did not
comprehend the superiority of the CT system over the commodity
taxes that it replaced, 297 or the substantial tax cuts that would have
been inconceivable but for the CT.
Unlike Japan prior to the introduction of the CT law, the United
States is relatively content with its present tax structure.298 Despite
this general comfort with the post-1986 tax system, some serious
problems require immediate attention and funding. A new tax sys-
tem, as opposed to an increase in existing tax rates, might be more
palatable to the President, Congress, and the public. 299
A broad-based VAT similar to that employed in Japan is a consid-
eration whose time has come. In 1949, the United States, through
the Shoup Mission, attempted to teach the Japanese something
about ideal tax policy. Forty years later, the Japanese, perhaps
295. For example, 90% of the corporations that reported income in 1987 yet paid no
federal income tax, were small corporations. Statement of Kenneth W. Gidean, Assistant Treasury
Secretary for Tax Policy, Before House Ways and Means Committee Hearing on Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Daily Rep. for Executives, at L2 (Feb. 8, 1990).
296. Japanese outrage over the CT appears to be a natural reaction to the volatile combi-
nation of political arguments favoring a VAT, business expectations of inordinate compliance
costs, and public resignation to impending inflation. A. TArr, supra note 1, at 172. Taxing
authorities should consider several public relation tactics to familiarize the public with a VAT
before it is implemented. See id. at 172-77 (listing ways that taxing authorities can minimize
VAT transitional problems: publicity to apprise public about tax, register taxpayers early, and
send tax officials to firms to oversee propriety of registration and documentation).
297. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing problems of public perception
associated with CT).
298. See A. TArr, supra note 1, at 31 (noting general satisfaction with current United States
tax structure).
299. A 1983 survey indicates that the American public would support a national sales tax
over an increase in income tax rates. Schenk, Value Added Tax, supra note 4, at 283.
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wiser, perhaps more realistic, or perhaps simply more in tune with
the interchange between efficiency, equity, and simplicity, may fi-
nally return the favor.
